



























Rád bych poděkoval svému vedoucím, Dr. Jiřímu Vinopalovi, za trpělivé a 



























Prohlašuji, že jsem bakalářskou/diplomovou/rigorózní/dizertační práci vypracoval/a 
samostatně, že jsem řádně citoval/a všechny použité prameny a literaturu a že práce nebyla 
využita v rámci jiného vysokoškolského studia či k získání jiného nebo stejného titulu. 
V Praze, dne 15. července 2019 
        ………………………………… 







Práce se zabývá tématem nestability postojů v čase a klade si tři základní otázky: Existuje 
postojová nestabilita? Jak běžný je výskyt postojové nestability? Co může být příčinou 
postojové nestability? Práce je kombinací rešerše předchozích studií, relevantních pro téma 
postojové nestability a sekundární analýzy několika data setů. Závěry práce jsou, že postojová 
nestabilita je reálně existující fenomén, spíše než artefakt měření. Dále, míra výskytu do 
značné míry závisí na operacionální definici postojové nestability, ale jedná se o relativně 
běžný jev. Determinanty postojové nestability jsou schopnosti a motivace jedince k tématu, 
stejně jako míra výskytu a konzistence prezentování tématu. 
Klíčová slova: veřejné mínění, postoje, postojová nestabilita, Receive-Accept-Sample model, 
Black-and-white model, Elaboration likelihood model of persuasion 
 
Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the topic of opinion instability and is centred on three questions: 
Does opinion instability exists? How prevalent opinion instability is? What may be the cause 
of opinion instability? The thesis combines previous studies relevant for the topic and 
secondary analysis of several datasets. The conclusions of the thesis are that opinion 
instability is a real phenomenon, rather than an artefact of measurement. Furthermore, the 
prevalence of opinion instability depends for a large part in its operationalization, although it 
can be considered relatively common. The determinants of opinion instability are the topic 
proficiency and motivation, as well as the prevalence of the topic and consistency of frames. 
Key words: Public opinion, opinions, attitudes, opinion instability, Receive-Accept-Sample 
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One of the most pressing contemporary questions is the participation of public in political 
process. Many political groups across Europe, including some in the Czech Republic, are 
increasingly advocating for the introduction of more direct means of public participation. A 
significant milestone in this effort was the politically binding British referendum about the 
leaving of the European Union. This referendum gives hope to those, who strive for a routine 
use of national referendums in the future. However, such degree of direct democracy is based 
on several implicit assumptions. Among others, it is assumed that individuals have stable, 
cohesive opinions about topics in question. However, this may not be the case. Previous 
research suggests that opinions are far from stable, as significant number of respondents 
possess a different opinion at one point in time than in previous, not so distant moment. In 
fact, it may be the case that most people do not hold a stable opinion about most topics they 
encounter. Unfortunately, research of opinion instability is currently underdeveloped. This 
thesis aims to at least partially remedy that. More specifically, this thesis will ask three 
questions: a) Does opinion instability exist? b) How prevalent opinion instability is? c) What 
are the causes of opinion instability? 
The first question is answered in chapter 2 Are opinions unstable? Such question may seem 
strange at first. After all, this whole thesis is dedicated to the idea that opinion instability does 
exist. However, as we will see, the notion that opinions are unstable has been disputed for 
almost as long as the topic has been researched. The core of this dispute stems from the topic 
of opinion measurement. More specifically, there is a lack of consensus on how much of the 
change between measurements can be attributed to a real change of opinion and how much 
is merely a measurement error. As we will see, this question still lacks a conclusive answer. 
Despite this perhaps unfulfilling conclusion, we will see that opinions at the very least can be 
unstable. This will lead us to the second main question of this thesis, i.e. how prevalent opinion 
instability is. The topic of prevalence will be discussed in chapter 3, titled Prevalence of opinion 
instability, which summarize previous studies on the topic, as well as discusses various 
approaches to the operationalization of opinion instability and their effect on the its 
prevalence. Lastly, chapter 4 Nature of opinion instability moves into a more theoretical 
territory. In this chapter, we will discuss several prominent models of opinion formation and 
use them to uncover possible sources of opinion instability. We will discuss both internal and 
7 
 
external factors of opinion instability and answer the question of why some people’s opinions 
are stable, while others are not. 
Since there is little consensus on the topic of opinion instability, this thesis is exploratory in 
nature. Rather than testing specific model or theory, it aims at establishing basics facts about 
opinion instability, as well as presenting several related theories, which are able to explain its 
existence. In the end, this thesis will hopefully serve as a comprehensive introduction into the 
topic of opinion instability and the readers will get a better understanding of the practical 
impact opinion instability has on public life. 
1.1. Data description 
Throughout this thesis I will use several datasets to either demonstrate, illustrate or test 
claims and findings present by the previously conducted studies. By all accounts, it should be 
possible for the reader of this work to assess the quality of data I use to demonstrate my 
conclusion. However I find that the methodological description of the data tends to break the 
flow of the text. For this reason, and because I will use the datasets repeatedly through the 
entire thesis, I will provide the basic description of the data used here, in one place. This 
chapter will include information about sampling and the data collection strategy. The 
information about specific tests and techniques will be presented in the main body of the text, 
as needed. 
The data sources used in this thesis are: 
1) Post-election study parliamentary elections 2013 (CVVM, 2013) 
This study was carried out in reaction to the Czech parliamentary elections and took 
place between October and November of 2013.  The study was based on quota 
sampling with quotas for sex, education, age, region and size of the settlement. The 
source for the quota proportions was the Czech census of 2010. The data were 
collected in the form of face to face interviews and includes 1 653 respondents. The 




2) Agenda setting study (Sociologický ústav et al., 2014) 
This panel study, including 12 waves, was conducted as a part of the project titled 
Veřejná a mediální agenda: komparativní analýza tematizace veřejné sféry and the 
data collection took place between October 2007 and February 2007. This study was 
based on multistage random sampling, with city districts and households serving as 
sampling units. Inside the households, respondents were selected through the method 
of the last birthday. The sample overrepresents women and underrepresents people 
with lower education. The data were gathered through face to face interviews and 
includes 658 respondents. The data is available at the Czech data archive for social 
sciences. 
3) BBC EU referendum poll tracker 
This is an aggregator of polls on the topic of British EU referendum, developed by BBC. 
The poll tracker shows the percentage of the British population in favour of leaving or 
remaining in the European Union from September 2015 to June 2016. The tracker 
includes 140 polls, 99 of which were conducted online and 41 conducted over 
telephone. The polls come from ten different polling agencies, including Yougov, Ipsos 




2. Are opinions unstable? 
Contemporary sociology relies, both in its academic and applied form, in a large part on data 
collected from surveys. These surveys in turn rely on assumptions that respondents hold 
reasonably cohesive opinions, which can be learned through properly constructed 
questionnaires. However, we can find a substantial amount of studies confronting the 
assumption of cohesive opinions held by the respondents. These studies show that a nontrivial 
number of respondents exhibits opinion instability that has to be taken into account during 
data analysis and interpretation. 
The question of opinion (in)stability first raised into prominence during the 1960’ through the 
work of Phillipe Converse (1964). Converse’s main motivation was to challenge the 
assumption held by contemporary scholars of democratic theory, who widely worked under 
assumptions that political opinions and behaviour of citizens are for most parts determined 
by their respective ideological orientation. Through the analysis of survey data, Converse 
reached three main conclusions. First of them is that there is only a weak, if any, connection 
between political ideology held by respondents and their opinions on specific issues 
(Converse, 1964). If the given opinions were truly derived from the held ideological systems, 
then the exhibited opinions should be consistent across a range of issues. For example, an 
individual following liberal ideology should declare a liberal opinion to most questions. 
However, this was not the case. The average ranked correlation coefficients ranged between 
0,11 and 0,23 for the mass public and between 0,25 and 0,53 for the elites (Converse, 1964, 
p. 32), where elites were defined as a sample of congress candidates of 1958.  This was by 
Converse taken as an evidence of little cohesion among opinions on related topics, which were 
only weakly constrained by overarching political ideology. Therefore, even in one specific 
moment in time, measured opinions were unstable in the sense that they were incongruent 
with each other. 
The second finding is concerned with temporal stability. If the respondent’s opinions are truly 
products of a robust political ideology, we would expect them to change slowly, over a long 
period of time. This means there should be a strong correlation between opinions given during 
first and second measurements. According to Converse’s data, this expectation was not 
confirmed. The temporal correlation coefficients were as low as 0.3 for the topics of federal 
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housing and foreign aid and reached their highest at about 0.5 for the topic of school 
desegregation. As we can see, people’s opinion shifted dramatically between the 
measurements. However, it must be mentioned that the timeframe between the 
measurements was quite large, two years to be exact. It can then be reasonably argued that 
the low observed correlations are not products of opinion instability, but of substantial shift 
in people’s attitudes and values. This potential explanation is however complicated by the fact 
that the measured temporal correlation of party identification reached the coefficient of 0.7. 
This means that while respondents significantly shifted their opinions on specific topics while 
their opinion about political parties remained more or less unchanged. In other words, policy 
preferences changed, while voting preferences did not. One would expect that if the source 
of policy preference changes was a deliberate shift in attitudes, this shift would also be 
reflected in choice of political party. This is however not the case and so Converse’s 
interpretation hold some merit. 
The last finding relates to temporal stability across more than two measurements. Converse 
measured opinions on a range of issues at three points in time with intervals of two years. The 
observed correlations between time 1 and time 2 are more or less the same as the correlations 
observed between time 1 and time 3. In other words, an opinion held four years ago is a good 
predictor of current opinion as is one measured two years ago. If the changes in opinions were 
deliberate, we would expect to see a specific pattern. The correlation between opinions 
measured closer to each other should be higher than the correlation measured during a larger 
time span. Since this is not the case, we don’t have evidence of systematic opinion change, 
instigated by for example deliberate change of attitudes. Instead it seems like the observed 
data are a product of random fluctuations. 
The three findings presented above (incoherence across topics, low temporal correlations and 
no systemic pattern of change) presented in Converse’s work marked the beginning of interest 
in the topic of opinion instability. Following studies have similar results. These studies found 
evidence of opinion instability in topics concerning environment and pollution (Hill, 2001), 
genetic engineering (Urban & Pfenning, 2000), gay rights (Craig, Martinez, Kane, & Gainous, 
2005), ideology, presidential approval, death penalty and consumer sentiment (Pacheco, 
2014), abortions (Brickman & Peterson, 2006), social expenditure and army (Nicolet & Sciarini, 
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2006).  These studies were concerned mainly with examining temporal instability and showing 
that a considerable number of individuals changes opinions in an erratic manner. 
While there is no study dedicated to the topic of opinion instability, which would be based on 
data originating in the Czech Republic, we can at least attempt to illustrate the three findings 
reached by Converse on publicly available data from related studies. 
First, we can look for an evidence of the ideological incoherence, i.e. the instability across 
topics. To this end, I use the post-election study from 2013, produced by the Czech Public 
Opinion Research Centre (Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění, 2013). The data were 
gathered following the parliamentary election and consist of a quota-based sample for the 
population over 18 years of age. For more technical details about the sample and the data 
gathering process, see the overview of the data used in this thesis available in chapter 1 - Data 
description.  
The post-election survey asked its respondents their opinion on range of specific topics. More 
specifically, the respondents were given several pairs of statements and were asked which 
one they personally prefer. The pairs of statements can be seen in table 1, and the 
respondents chose between them on an eleven-point scale. 
Table 1 - Statements on the topic of economy (Post-election study 2013) 
 STATEMENT 1  STATEMENT 2 
1) Substantial amount of the expenditure 
for healthcare, education, etc. should 
be paid for by the individuals. 
vs Substantial amount of the expenditure for 
healthcare, education, etc. should be paid 
for by the state. 
2) All businesses owned by the state 
should be privatized 
vs The state should keep most of its businesses 
in its ownership. 
3) The main priority of the government 
should be the fight against 
unemployment. 
vs The main priority of the government should 
be lowering the inflation and the budget 
deficit. 
4) The people with higher income should 
pay higher taxes. 
vs The tax rate should be the same for 
everyone no matter their income. 
 
Furthermore, respondents were asked to place themselves on the left-right scale, according 
to their political orientation. This scale also ranged between eleven points. 
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Based on the previous studies on opinion instability, and contrary to logic of traditional 
theories of democratic practice, we are expecting low correlations between the economic 
preferences of the respondents and their political orientation.  
Table 2, showing Spearman ranked correlation coefficients, confirms our expectations. The 
highest measured correlation between opinions on individual topics is 0.44 for the opinions 
on social services expenditure and privatizations. These two (ranked) variables share circa 19 
% of variance. A Correlation of this strength does show existence of a general trend. However, 
it also shows great variance in individual responses. Furthermore, the rest of the correlation 
coefficients is even lower, with opinion on Unemployment vs deficit being particularly weakly 
connected to the rest. 
Table 2 – Rank correlations between opinions on economic topics and political orientation 
(Post-election study 2013)  







(n = 1551) 
-0.16 
(n = 1581) 
-0.37 
(n = 1595) 
-0.35 
(n = 1413) 
Privatization 0.44 
(n = 1551) 
 -0.13 
(n = 1525) 
-0.29 
(n = 1530) 
-0.33 




(n = 1581) 
-0.13 
(n = 1557) 
 0.31 




(n = 1595) 
-0.29 
(n = 1530) 
0.31 
(n = 1564) 
 0.43 




(n = 1413) 
-0.33 
(n = 1373) 
0.23 
(n = 1391) 
0.43 
(n = 1397) 
 
 
If we look at the correlations related to the political orientation, we will not see a significant 
improvement. Again, the highest measured correlation is circa 0.44, for the relationship 
between political orientation and opinions on taxation. While the general nature of the 
relationships between political orientation and opinions on specific topics goes into the 
correct direction, i.e. people on the left tend to support left wing policies and vice versa, the 
opinions of respondents are not particularly constrained by their political ideology. I would 
therefore argue that Converse’s first finding was successfully replicated. 
Next, we move towards the question of instability over time. If the respondents truly don’t 
hold coherent opinions, we would expect to find low correlations between measurements 
taken at different points in time. To check this, I will use data originally produced as a part of 
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research project focused on the Agenda setting theory (Škodová & Nečas, 2009). This panel 
survey was carried out between the year 2006 and 2007 and is comprised of twelve waves. As 
is the case with previously used datasets, you can find more details in chapter 1 - Data 
description. 
For the purpose of this thesis, waves 2, 6 and 10 are of special interest to us. In these waves, 
the respondents were asked about their opinion considering an American military radar, 
which was supposed to be built on the Czech grounds. Specifically, they were told: 
“The Czech government is planning, with the cooperation of the USA, to build a military radar 
base in our country. Some people say that building the radar will increase the security of the 
Czech Republic. Others say that building the radar will endanger the Czech Republic. To which 
of the opinions do you feel closer to?” 
The respondents were asked to respond on a scale from 0 to 10, where 10 meant they 
absolutely believed that building the radar will endanger the Czech Republic. 
If we assume, in accordance with the previous research, that the respondents will not hold 
stable opinions on this topic, we would expect a low correlation between measurements 
taken in wave 2 and wave 6 and similarly low correlations between measurements of waves 
6 and 10. 
As table 3 shows, this is not the case. Spearman rank correlations across air pairs, with the 
highest reaching value 0.89, which translates into 80 % shared variance of the ranked 
variables. Even the lowest measured correlation coefficient does not fall below 0.8. The 
respondents therefore expressed fairly stable opinions across time. However, it must be said 
that the timeframe of the Agenda setting study, from which the data originated, was much 
smaller than the timeframe of the study done by Converse. In the Czech data, each wave was 
separated by only several weeks and the whole study covered a period of one year. On the 
other hand, Converse’s measurements were separated by the period of two years. One 
possible explanation for this difference is that while opinions may be unstable in the long run, 
there is a shorter period through which they remain stable. Another explanation is that the 
respondents may have remembered their answers from the previous waves, especially since 
the topic was of a high importance at the time. In fact, studies with wider timeframe reported 
results similar to ones Converse presented in his study (Hill, 2001; Pacheco, 2014). 
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Nevertheless, our data doesn’t support previous findings, even if the significantly different 
time period between waves makes direct comparison difficult. 
Table 3 - Rank correlations across time on the topic of the USA radar (Agenda setting study 2007) 
 Wave 2 Wave 6 Wave 10 
Wave 2  0.83 0.82 
Wave 6 0.83  0.89 
Wave 10 0.82 0.89  
 
Lastly, there is the question of pattern of correlations across several measurements. Here, we 
may expect two possibilities. If the respondents changed their opinions in a systemic manner, 
i.e. encountered something that provoked genuine and a long-standing opinion change, we 
would expect the correlations to be stronger between measurements that are closer to each 
other over time. On the other hand, if the opinion change was driven randomly, we would 
expect all correlation coefficients to be about the same, i.e. the opinion held in the 10th wave 
could be predicted by the opinion held at the 6th as well as by the opinion held in the 2nd wave. 
By looking at table 3, we can see that the latter options fit our data better. All the correlation 
coefficients are about the same, though all are quite high, which suggests that no systemic 
change of opinions took place. 
This way, we managed to confront the findings of previous studies with the data set in the 
Czech context. This comparison is not ideal, as the data were split across multiple datasets 
and gathered across different timeframes. However, we have seen that while this data 
provides some support for the claims about opinion instability, some results were 
contradictory. Furthermore, even other studies, ones better fitted for the study of this 
phenomenon, brought mixed (J. Druckman & Leeper, 2012; Pacheco, 2014; Sciarini & Kriesi, 
2003) or negative results (Ansolabehere, Rodden, & Snyder, 2008; J. N. Druckman, Fein, & 
Leeper, 2012). In fact there were several pressing methodological issues raised about the 
studies done by Converse and his followers (Achen, 1975; Brickman & Peterson, 2006; J. 
Druckman & Leeper, 2012). 
15 
 
2.1. Methodological critique 
The crux of these concerns lies in the topic of measurement reliability, or rather in lack of 
thereof. Reliability in this context is defined as the “correlation between two measured scores 
taken at different times when the true score are unchanged” (Achen, 1975, p. 1223). This 
definition of reliability, based on classic test theory, assumes that if one concept is measured 
at two points in time, we can isolate the error variance caused by the measurement 
instrument. That is, as long as the conditions remain the same. 
These authors also, quite rightly, assume that the measurement instrument used to measure 
opinions of the respondents is not without measurement error. This error can originate in 
several ways. Firstly, the questions may be formulated in a vague or confusing way. This can 
make the interpretation difficult, as the respondents are not sure what they are asked, 
resulting in less reliable measurement. Secondly, the response may not be precise enough to 
capture the state of respondent’s opinions. Suppose for example, that a person held a true 
opinion about the danger presented by an American radar building, which can be expressed 
on a scale from 0 to 10 as a number 8.5. However, most scales only offer integers as possible 
answers. Thus, the true opinion the respondent holds cannot be expressed. Instead, the 
respondent is forced between the values 8 and 9 and since the distance from their true 
opinion to either of the values is the same, the respondent will pick at random. On repeated 
measurements, the answers of the respondent will oscillate between said two values, with 
each having a 50 % probability of being selected. This leads to a situation, where even though 
the respondent holds a true stable opinion and understands the question perfectly, they will 
still exhibit signs of opinion instability. This instability however would entirely be a product of 
a measurement error. 
Fortunately, the definition of reliability presented above offers a solution. If we assume that 
the opinions held by respondents are mostly stable over time and changing slowly in a 
predictable way, we can use the repeated measurements to compute the reliability of the 
instrument and through it, estimate the amount of variance produced by measurement error. 
Once we know what proportion of the variance can be attributed to measurement error, we 
can subtract it from the total variance and following that get an unbiased estimate of the 
relationship between measurements taken at different times. This is in fact exactly what 
Achen (1975) did for the data used by Converse in his first study (Converse, 1964). 
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This correction dramatically raised the correlations between measurements at different times, 
as can be seen in table 4. This table is a reduced version of the one presented in the original 
study. As we can see, correlation coefficients that previously ranged between 0.25 and 0.51 
in most cases raised to the range between 0.71 and 0.99. The temporal correlations between 
measurements are estimated to be much higher than originally thought, suggesting that 
respondents held a stable opinion even over a long period of time. Furthermore, in most cases 
the correlations between the second and third measurement is higher than the measurement 
between the first and the third one, thus casting doubt at the third finding presented by 
Converse, as mentioned above. 
Table 4 - Pearson Correlations (r) Between Attitudes in Converse's Panel Study, Time Periods 1, 2, 3 (Achen 1975) 
 Observed correlations  Corrected correlations 
 
1-2 2-3 1-3  1-2 2-3 1-3 
Federal assistance to Negroes 0.51 0.51 0.49  0.95 0.98 0.93 
Scholl Integration 0.45 0.55 0.42  0.80 0.96 0.76 
Isolationism 0.37 0.46 0.35  0.79 0.96 0.71 
Foreign Aid 0.32 0.44 0.31  0.72 0.99 0.71 
Maintain Army Overseas 0.31 0.37 0.25  0.63 0.81 0.49 
 
However, not all estimates benefited from the applied correction by the same magnitude. 
Notably, the corrected correlations concerning opinion on maintaining army overseas, while 
improved, remained relatively low. On average, the measurement shared 66 % of variance, 
after the correction was applied, whereas they only shared 16 % of variance before. 
Similar objections were also raised for the estimates of opinion instability across topics. As 
Ansolabehere et al. (2008) show, using multiple measures of opinion on certain topics at one 
moment, i.e. using a battery of items instead of choosing to use single questions, can 
significantly raise the value of estimated correlation coefficients. This is explained as an effect 
of more reliable measurement. The measured correlations were increasing in a stable and 
predictable way as the number of items per scale increased. In fact, in the above mentioned 
study, correlations between scales made of five items were about three times as strong as 
correlations between single items. 
As we have seen, the notion of an unreliable measurement tool can play a significant role in 
the research of opinion instability. We should therefore take these considerations into 
account. To this end, I applied the reliability correction, as described by Aschen, to the data 
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from the Agenda setting study. This correction is based on the assumption that no systemic 
opinion change took place, therefore all observed changes are erroneous. Ashen further 
postulates that the observed changes are due to the random error, i.e. due to the vagueness 
of questions or the fact that the questions measure a continuous concept on ordinal scale. 
The mean of the random error is assumed to zero. From these assumptions, the error portion 
variance can be estimated. From the error variance, reliability coefficient for each 
measurement can be computed and used to correct the observed correlations. The process is 
described in more detail in the Aschen’s study. The results can be seen in table 5. As expected, 
the corrected correlation coefficients are higher than the observed. The magnitude of 
improvement is nowhere near as big as the one demonstrated on Converse’s data. This is 
understandable as the observed correlations were much higher in the first place and the 
margin for improvement consequently lower. This can be explained in two ways. The first is 
the already mentioned effect of smaller timeframe and shorter gaps between measurements. 
The second possible explanation is that the measurement instrument used in the Agenda 
setting study is of higher quality than the one used by Converse. This is not an unrealistic 
proposition, considering that the two studies are separated by almost half a century of 
methodological advancement. The higher temporal correlations in the Agenda setting study 
compared to the previous studies on the topic of opinion instability could be therefore partly 
explained as a result of better answer scales (eleven points instead of five), clearer and more 
precise question wording, better trained interviewers, and so on. 






Additional share of 
variance explained 
Wave 2 : Wave 6 0.83 0.87 7 % 
Wave 6 : Wave 10 0.90 1 19 % 
Wave 2 : Wave 10 0.83 0.87 7 % 
 
No matter the reason for specific difference, we have seen that applying reliability correction 
paints a significantly more optimistic picture of people’s ability to hold stable opinions. 
However, just as the original studies had to deal with critique coming from the field of 
measurement theory, this critique has several weak points. 
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First, let’s focus on proportion of shared and unique variance between correlated variables. 
As mentioned before the measurement in Converse’s study shared on average 66 % of 
variance, after the Aschen’s correction was applied. This consequently means, that there still 
were 34 % of variance unique to either variable. Normally, such thing could be easily explained 
as an error of measurement. However, in this case, the error of measurement has been 
explicitly corrected as this was the main object of the study. Yet some level of discrepancy 
between the opinions measured at different time points remains. Thus, while the prevalence 
of opinion instability may not be as big as Converse concluded, the data still suggests it is a 
real phenomenon, even when the reliability of measurement instruments is taken into 
account. 
A second weak point of the reliability argument is connected to an assumption, upon which it 
is based. As mentioned, the estimation of reliability is based on the assumption that as long 
as the true score doesn’t change, the differences between measurements can be attributed 
to the measurement error. However, this is not necessarily true. Remember the example of a 
respondent and their opinion on the USA military radar in the Czech Republic. The classic 
measurement theory assumes that this respondent has a true opinion, which can be 
expressed as a theoretical score on the answer scale. If this true score is unviable as an answer, 
for example because the true score 8.5 and the scale only includes integer, a measurement 
error occurs. In our example, a respondent with a true score of 8.5 will randomly oscillate 
between answer scores 8 and 9. This assumption allows for the estimation of the 
measurement error. 
However, as pointed by Zaller (1992), there is another explanation of such behaviour. Zaller 
argues that people are to some extent ambivalent considering most topics and the opinions 
they express can be best understood as short time constructs made specifically for the 
moment, when an answers is required. The process of creation of these constructs is to an 
extent sensitive to the context in which the questioning takes place. This would mean that no 
true score, as understood by the classic measurement theory, exists. The opinion formation 
model proposed John Zaller will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. For now, let’s go 
back to our hypothetical respondent and their opinion about the USA military radar. However, 
this time we will describe it through opinion ambivalence. This respondent doesn’t hold an 
opinion about such topic in his mind at all time. When they are asked about it for the first 
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time, they make an opinion on the spot. This specific opinion will be influenced by the current 
context, such as what did the respondent see/watch on television last night, what was the last 
time they talked about this topic with others and so on. Based on this context, the respondent 
may decide that his opinion can be best expressed as the score of 8 at the answer scale. Now 
let’s move to the second time of the second measurement. The respondent still doesn’t hold 
a long-term opinion on the topic in his mind and must construct it anew. Even if the knowledge 
the respondent possesses about the topic is still the same, the context will be different. It may 
have been a longer period of time since they discussed the topic with other people, which may 
lead to remembering less information. They may have seen a differently framed story on the 
television the night before, leading them to remember different information. This new context 
will mean that the process of opinion formation will be different. This time, the respondent 
may decide that his opinion may be best expressed by the score of 9. This means that the 
respondent will oscillate between scores 8 and 9 across measurements. However, in this 
example, the cause of such oscillation is not the error of measurement. In fact, based on this 
model, no longstanding true score exists and so the reliability of the instrument cannot be 
estimated, at least not in the way Aschen proposed. The true score only exists for a short while 
necessary for the respondent to answer a given question. 
Aschen and others treat all the oscillations as a measurement error and corrects them. 
However, this is only valid under the assumption that there is a long standing and unchanging 
true score representing the true opinion of the respondent. This is a sensible assumption when 
the measurements are taken very closely to each other but becomes problematic as the time 
gap between measurements grows. When the time between measurements spans weeks or 
even years, the idea that the respondents still hold the construct in their mind becomes 
problematic. When we apply the reliability correction on data with big time gaps between 
measurements, we may overestimate the stability of opinions held by the respondents and 
inadvertently “overcorrect” for error that does not exist, at least not in the extent we expect. 
In such case, the extent of opinion instability will be severally underestimated. Therefore, I 
would argue that the correlation coefficients corrected using the reliability correction indicate 
the minimal amount of opinion instability in the data, but not necessarily the actual one. 
Aschen’s results in table 4 thus indicates that instability can be minimal, but it does not prove 
that it necessarily is. 
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At this point, we can see that the answer to the question “Are opinions (un)stable?” is not a 
straightforward one. There is an ample amount of research showing evidence for the 
existence of opinion instability. The true nature of this instability is however not readily 
apparent. The most straightforward explanation for the observed change between 
measurements is that the opinions held in respondents’ minds, i.e. their qualitative 
judgements of the topic, has changed. Some authors, such as Converse or Zaller, would 
however argue that the entire notion of opinions as long-lasting constructs stored inside one’s 
memory is misleading. Instead, opinions are constructed off the top of the head whenever 
needed. This construction process is heavily influenced by the context in which it takes place 
and it is therefore unsurprising that opinions constructed in different context are qualitatively 
different. No matter, which of these two explanations is more correct, the final result is the 
same: a significant number of respondents possess a different opinion at one point in time 
than in previous, not so distant moment. This conclusion must however be confronted with 
valid methodological concerns. Namely, the measurement of opinions through surveys is not 
flawless and researchers must take the notion of measurement error into account. This 
measurement error may potentially account for a considerable amount of the observed 
opinion change. On the other hand, even when these concerns, are taken into account, the 
data still show that certain amount of instability of opinions exist. Furthermore, the estimation 
of measurement error is by itself based on a set of assumptions, which can be disputed. 
Therefore, despite the methodological concerns about survey measurement, the general 
existence of opinion instability is well supported. However, not every person is affected by the 
opinion instability at every occasion. The next question therefore becomes, how prevalent the 




3. Prevalence of opinion instability 
In the previous chapter, we established opinion instability as a real phenomenon, instead of 
an artefact of measurement. While this finding forms an important basis for further research, 
it is not overly in and by itself. Merely stating, some people changing their opinions in an 
erratic way is not enough. The naturally following question would be, how many people of 
that sort are there. Or to be more specific: How prevalent is opinion instability in the 
population? 
3.1. Prevalence of opinion instability in previous studies 
In search for an answer to this question, I looked for previously done studies concerned with 
opinion instability. In the previous chapter, we established that there are two kinds of opinion 
instability. Instability across topics, that is the incoherence of opinions across different related 
topics, and instability across time. I will focus on instability across time, as this seems the more 
under-researched of the two. Therefore, I focused on previous studies dealing with this type 
of instability. Because of the time aspect, it is not surprising that a vast majority of such studies 
is based on panel data. However, few of the studies are actually done on aggregated cross-
sectional surveys. In such case, the unit of analysis is understandably not individuals but rather 
publics (e.g. the public of Switzerland, the publics of the US states). I also only included studies 
that in some way indicated the prevalence of opinion instability present. This meant the 
exclusion of studies, which were mainly concerned with causal mechanisms of opinion 
instability. Such studies were usually of experimental design and didn’t make claims about the 
representativity of a wider population. Lastly, as we will soon see, there is no single accepted 
measure of opinion instability. Some studies carried out in the tradition set by the earliest 
works on the topic and utilized correlation coefficients as a comprehensive measure of 
congruence between opinions at different time. Other opted for the more easily 
comprehendible proportion of respondents who changed their opinion between 
measurements. Few studies used the difference between mean scale scores. . Lastly, note that 
the presented studies did not explicitly take measurement error into account. This means that 
the reliability correction was not applied to them. The results of the presented studies can 
therefore be conservatively interpreted as the maximal possible amount of opinion instability 
present. However, as was established in the previous chapter, the application of reliability 
correction does not explain all differences between measurements and also is best 
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understood as the minimal amount of opinion instability. The presented figures are therefore 
possibly somewhat overestimated.  
The list of studies I have discovered can be seen in table 6. There are 13 separate studies, 
which reported the extent of opinion instability. Some of these involve measuring opinions on 
more than one topic. Overall, we have 44 estimates of opinion instability on topics ranging 
from presidential popularity to genetic engineering. Please note that despite my best effort 
and rather strict specification of which works to include, the methodology of presented 
studies varies wildly. The size of time gaps between measurements ranges from ten days to 
two years, although most studies used a time gap of several months. Furthermore, the 
sampling design and population of origin also differs, as the studies come from various 
countries, such as the USA or Switzerland. This makes a direct comparison of opinion 
instability prevalence difficult. Despite all this, I believe these results can bring at least a 
preliminary overview of the phenomenon, since no more detailed study exists. 
As explained above, most of the studies expressed opinion instability in a form of correlation 
coefficients between measurements. In such cases, high correlation coefficients are 
favourable, i.e. the higher the coefficient, the lesser the amount of opinion instability. Other 
studies expressed opinion instability as a proportion of respondents who changed their 
opinion in between the measurements. In such cases, a smaller number is preferable, as they 
indicate that a smaller number of respondents exhibited opinion change. Note that some 
studies, mainly the one using correlation coefficients, included more than two measurements. 
In these cases, the expressed coefficient represented the average correlation between all 
pairs of measurements.  In studies reporting the proportion of opinion change, the reported 
number represents the relative frequency of respondents, who changed their opinion at least 




Table 6  - Previous studies concerned with the prevalence of opinion instability 





Hill (2001) Speed limits 0,68 4 6 months 
 Tax on CO2 0.58 4 6 months 
 Gas Price increase 0.61 4 6 months 
 Electric Vehicles 0.44 4 6 months 
 Car-Free Zones 0.52 4 6 months 
 Parking Restrictions 0.48 4 6 months 
 Presidential popularity 0.70 3 4 months 
Pacheco (2014) State partisanship 0.46 Varies Varies 
 State ideology 0.59 Varies Varies 
 Education spending 0.90 Varies Varies 
 Welfare Spending 0.74 Varies Varies 
 Death Penalty 0.30 Varies Varies 
 Abortion 0.20 Varies Varies 
 Presidential approval 0.99 Varies Varies 
 Consumer sentiment 1.00 Varies Varies 
Ansolabehere et al. (2008) Lower income assistance 0.67 2 2 years 
 Moral regulation and rights 0.71 2 3 years 
 Affirmative actions and 
desegregation 
0.72 2 4 years 
Converse (1964) Federal assistance to negroes 0.50 2 2 years  
School integration 0.47 2 2 years  
Isolationism 0.39 2 2 years  
Foreign aid 0.36 2 2 years  
Maintain armies oversea 0.31 2 2 years  
Federal aid to education 0.45 2 2 years  
Guaranteed jobs 0.45 2 2 years  
Housing and electricity 0.37 2 2 years  
Party identification 0.83 2 2 years  
Church attendance 0.65 2 2 years 
Opinion instability expressed as proportion of change 
Urban & Pfenning (2000) Genetic engineering 48% 3 6 months 
Tedin (1986) Presidential popularity 33% 3 4 months 
Sciarini & Kriesi (2003) EU membership 23% 3 3 months 
 Maternity insurance 25% 3 4 months 
 Asylum 25% 3 5 months 
 Bilateral treaties 28% 3 6 months 
 Working time 29% 3 7 months 
 Old age pension 37% 3 8 months 
 Deficit reduction 41% 3 9 months 
Freeder, Lenz, & Turney 
(2018) 
Economic attitude scale 60% 2 4 years 
Fournier et al. (2004) Vote preference 58% 1  
Nicolet & Sciarini (2006) Vote preference 73% 2 4 years 
Zaller (1992) Cooperation with Russia 46% 2 6 months  
Level of government service 45% 2 6 months 
Opinion instability expressed difference in means 
Rogowski & Tucker (2018) Gun control 
3.9 
(% points) 
2 1 month 
Druckman & Leeper (2012) Support for the Patriot act 
0.02 
(on scale) 




Most of the studies presented here are based on panel data. The study by Pacheco (2014) is 
based on aggregated data from opinion polls across several decades and the units of analysis 
are states in the USA. The second exception is the work of Fournier, Nadeau, Blais, Gidengil, 
& Nevitte (2004), which is based on a post-election study. The respondents were asked which 
party they preferred at the start of the election period and this information was compared 
with their reported vote. Because of this, the results of these two studies are expected to 
differ from the rest. Lastly, note that none of the studies presented here took into account the 
possibility of genuine opinion, i.e. all changes in opinions are treated as opinion instability. 
However, it is not unreasonable to expect that at least some of the changes are products of 
deliberate, long lasting opinion change. The results in table 6 are thus best understood as an 
indication of the maximal amount of opinion instability present. 
Altogether, these studies show a great deal of variability. In studies based on correlations, the 
relationship between opinions across measurements range from almost non-existent (r = 0.2) 
to virtually perfect (r = 1). The first quartile has a value of 0.44 and the third quartile a value 
of 0.7, with standard deviation being 0.2. Similarly, the studies based on the proportion of 
change have a minimum of 23 % and a maximum of 73 %, indicating that individuals with 
unstable opinions can make up both, a minority and a majority of population, depending on 
the context.  The interquartile range ranges between values 28 % and 48 %, with standard 
deviation being 0.14. Lastly, there were only two studies, which measured opinion instability 
as difference between means, making computing of any statistics superfluous. As we can see, 
the prevalence of opinion instability differs significantly across studies. We must therefore 
ask, why such considerable differences occur. 
3.2. Aspects influencing the observed prevalence of opinion instability  
Several explanations are possible. First may be the already mentioned effect of time in-
between measurements. It is not unreasonable to assume that the extent of opinion instability 
will grow larger as the time between measurements increases, whether the reason for it is. 
The respondents may remember their previous answer, i.e. they still hold the constructed 
opinion in their head, or that more instances of genuine opinion change took place or other 
something altogether different. No matter the reason, the available studies support this 
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assumption. If we compute rank correlation between the number of months between 
measurements and the correlation between measurements, a relatively weak negative 
relationship is to be observed (r = -0.2). Furthermore, rank correlation between the number 
of months between measurements and the proportion of respondents who changed their 
opinion is rather large and positive (r = 0.7), as expected. This can be taken as evidence that 
the timeframe of studies does indeed play a role in the prevalence of opinion instability. Note 
however, that the sample of studies is rather small and two of the studies, specifically Pacheco 
(2014) and Fournier (2004) employed significantly different methodologies from the rest. The 
former one because it is based on a larger number of aggregate data and the time between 
measurements is not constant. The latter because, as mentioned above, the study actually 
involved only one measurement. The removal of these studies results in a loss of 9 estimates 
of opinion instability (eight for correlation coefficients, one for proportion of change). 
Another possible factor may be the topic, to which were the measured opinions related. The 
opinions on presidential popularity are among the most stable ones, with the average 
correlation of 0.85 and only 33 % of proportion of change. Similarly, party identification is a 
topic of notable opinion stability. However, bear in mind that studies concerned with 
presidential approval and party identification are of American origin, where these concepts 
may be understood in a vastly different way than in Europe. For comparison, vote preference, 
when measured on the Swiss (Nicolet & Sciarini, 2006) and Canadian (Fournier et al., 2004) 
population, is among the topics with most prevalent opinion instability, with the average 
proportion of change of 66 %. Among other topics, on which the respondents exhibited a 
significant level of stability includes EU membership, asylum policy and consumer sentiment. 
On the other hand, the topics of support of electric vehicles, death penalty and genetic 
engineering were among the least stable ones. As we can see, the extent of opinion instability 
varies across topics, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4. Unfortunately, 
opinions on most topics were only measured once and across different populations, which 
prevents us from examining a specific pattern. Nevertheless, it is clear that just because the 
respondents exhibited a large amount of instability on one topic, it does not necessarily mean 
they cannot be trusted on others. We will discuss possible explanations for why the topic 
matters in later chapters, in regard to respondents’ interests and abilities. 
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So far, we discussed mostly the self-evident explanations of differences in the extent of 
opinion instability. However, there is a possibility of other, more subtle factors. One of these 
factors is whether the researcher approaches the topic of opinion instability from micro or 
macro perspective (J. Druckman & Leeper, 2012). As we have discussed, there is no generally 
accepted approach to the measurement of instability over time. Some researchers opt for a 
macro perspective, i.e. aggregating results of several cross-sectional surveys and computing 
the level of differences between time points, such as a change in the number of people 
supporting some policy. This approach benefits from an immense number of data available 
for secondary analysis, enabling research across long time periods. Some of these studies, 
such as the works of Bélanger & Pétry (2005), Page & Shapiro (1992) or Pacheco (2014), map 
the development of public opinion across decades. 
On the other hand, researchers may instead approach the problem from a micro perspective. 
The micro based studies are based on panel or experimental data and are mainly concerned 
with changes of opinions in individual respondents. The micro approach allows for more 
precise measurement of opinion change. Furthermore, micro based studies are often not only 
concerned with the prevalence of opinion instability, but also with its causes (e.g. Hill, 2001; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Zaller, 1992). This is especially true for the experimental studies, such 
as Chong & Druckman (2010). However, as pointed out by Druckman & Leeper (2012), the 
choice of approach can subtly influence the amount of opinion instability measured in the 
data. The choice of questions in the cross-sectional surveys is often lead by the demand from 
the media or the public. Because of this, the measured opinions are often about topics, which 
felt to be the most pressing or interesting at the time. We can reasonably expect that 
respondents will have more stable opinions on topics they are more invested in. On the other 
hand, topics, which are deemed unimportant or uninteresting, seldomly appear in most 
surveys. However, the situation is exactly opposite for the micro based studies. Because the 
goal of such studies is to try explain the mechanisms leading to opinion instability, they 
purposely choose less popular topics, where the opinion instability is more likely to appear 
(e.g. Chong & Druckman, 2010). This presents a problem, when trying to estimate the 
prevalence of opinion instability. Because macro based studies avoid less important topics, 
they tend to underestimate the general level of instability expressed by the respondents. On 
the other hand, the micro based studies often, for research purposes, include less pressing 
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topics, which in turn lead to the overestimation of the amount of opinion instability. Again, 
the effect of topic in question will be more deeply discussed in chapter 4. 
However, the choice of topic may not be the only factor, which leads to systematically 
different results between macro and micro based studies. In macro based studies, it is very 
possible for opinion instability of individual respondents to cancel each other out, due to the 
very nature of the aggregation process. This is a possibility no matter if opinion instability leads 
to random or systemic changes. If opinion instability manifests as a random process, i.e. if 
respondents oscillates by the same amount between several answers, then the expected 
value of opinion change would be zero. In similar vein, we may imagine a hypothetical 
example, where, during the first measurement, half of the respondents accept introduction 
of some policy and the other half rejects it. Now imagine that at the time of the second 
measurement, the two groups switched sides. The people who previously accepted the policy 
now reject it and vice versa. In such case, we would end up with half of the population 
supporting the policy during both measurements, despite every person changing their opinion 
in a systemic way. As such, a small change of opinion in the macro based studies may indicate 
either high level of opinion stability or the fact that the opinions of present subpopulations 
changed by approximately the same amount in all directions. Thus, the macro based studies 
potentially underestimate the amount of opinion instability in another way. 
3.3. Operationalization of opinion instability  
As we have seen so far, the prevalence of opinion instability is hard to estimate because of 
various confounding factors, such as the topic in question, time between measurements and 
even the differences stemming from the macro and micro divide. There is one more, no less 
important, factor, which has a great impact on how severe opinion instability we will observe. 
This factor is the operationalization of opinion instability, i.e. how we define the instability in 
the data. This question, despite being central to the empirical research of our topic, has no 
clear answer. We have already seen some possible solutions, namely correlation coefficients 
and proportion of people, who changed their opinions. However, these approaches are but 
two of the myriad of others we can think of. I will demonstrate several potential possibilities 
of operationalization opinion instability. The purpose of this exercise is to discuss the strength 
and weaknesses of each approach and determine how much will the prevalence of opinion 
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instability change, based on the operationalization chosen. For suitable data, we will turn once 
again to the Agenda setting study, which we already encountered in the previous chapter. 
The first option is to rely on correlation coefficients. This is a traditional approach, proposed 
by Phillipe Converse (1964) and, as can be seen from table 6, still the most popular. The 
advantage is clear. Correlation coefficients present a well-established way to determine 
strength of relationship between variables and are computationally simple. We should note 
that there are of course several types of correlation coefficients, which differ subtly in their 
definition of what a relationship is. The main difference is between “simple” (i.e. product-
moment) and rank coefficients. While the simple coefficients, e.g. Pearson correlation 
coefficient, are computed from the measured values, the rank coefficients, as the name 
suggests, are computed from ranked observation. This may influence the estimated amount 
of opinion instability. Using simple correlation coefficient can be understood as a more strict 
approach, since it requires the opinion given at different times to be exactly equal for perfect 
opinion stability to occur. On the other hand, rank coefficients only demand the ranks to be 
the same. For example, if the concerns about the American radar among the most fearful 
respondents grew over time, simple correlation coefficients would grow smaller, while the 
rank coefficients would stay the same. Thus, if we were to understand the stability of opinions 
as respondents holding the same opinions over time, we would choose a simple correlation 
coefficient. If we were only interested in relative differences between respondents, i.e. those 
most concerned at time 1 should be also the most concerned at time 2, we would use a rank 
correlation coefficient. On the other hand, the results produced by different types of 
coefficients should be similar in most cases unless the relationship between opinions 
measured across time is severally non-linear. 
While correlation coefficients are effective in their simplicity, they have two drawbacks in 
connection to opinion instability. First, they offer no information about the instability of 
individual respondents. Various differences on the individual level can produce coefficients of 
similar strength. It is therefore impossible to tell if measured correlation is the product of a 
large swing of opinions in a small subsample of respondents or if it was produced by smaller 
change affecting larger number of individuals. Second, and in my opinion more important, 
drawback of the correlation coefficients is their lack of substantive interpretation. While 
researchers adopted a set of rules to interpret correlation coefficients in some substantive 
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way, these rules are arbitrary in nature, varying across fields and subfields (Hemphill, 2003; 
Mukaka, 2012). Situation will also not improve by much when the coefficients are transformed 
into a proportion of shared variance. For example, consider the correlation between 
measurements in the Agenda setting study. These correlation coefficients refer to the 
opinions about building an American military radar in the Czech Republic. The resulting 
coefficients between all three waves of measurement range between 0.827 and 0.897. In the 
case of correlation between the first two measurements, the Pearson correlation coefficient 
has a value of 0.84, which can be translated as 70.5 % of shared variance. There is not much 
to say about opinion instability in such case besides guessing that “it may not be so bad”. 
However, the true extent of instability remains hidden. 
While correlation coefficients remain the most used approach to assess opinion instability 
across measurements, partly perhaps because of tradition, they lack substantial 
interpretation. As such, they should be only used as a relative measurement of opinion 
instability. They will find their use when comparing the prevalence of opinion instability across 
groups or topics, provided that the methodology of measurement remained the same. 
Furthermore, Pearson correlation coefficient should be used, when possible, as it fits the 
classic, and stricter, definition of opinion instability. 
Since correlation coefficients are not ideal candidates for expressing opinion instability, we 
turn to the second most used approach, the proportion of change. A simple proportion of 
change is computed as a relative frequency of respondents who changed their opinion 
between the measurements. Table 7 shows this value for the opinions on the topic of the 
American radar. As we can see, slightly less than a half of the respondents change their opinion 
between each wave. Furthermore, 60 % of respondents changed their opinion at least once 
during the whole timeframe of the study. Correspondently, this means that 40 % of 
respondents never changed their opinion on the topic of the American radar. Remember, that 
the correlation between the first and second measurement has the value of 0.84. This was 
despite the fact that 45 % of the respondents changed their opinion! This highlights the 
problem of comparing the prevalence of opinion instability across studies using different 
approaches. High values of correlation coefficient do not necessarily correspond with a low 
number of proportion of change. 
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Table 7 - Proportion of opinion change and correlations on the topic of the USA radar (Agenda setting study 2007) 
 Between 1st and 2nd  
measurement 
Between 2nd and 3rd 
measurement 
Total 
Proportion of change 45 % 41 % 60 % 
Simple correlation 0.83 0.90  
  
The main strength of the proportion of change lies in the straightforward interpretation. While 
the correlation coefficients rely on arbitrary thresholds of strength, the proportion of change 
offers a readily available answer. Furthermore, the proportion of change can be used to assess 
opinion instability not only across pairs of measurement, but also across the entire timeframe 
of the study. This can be done by computing the total proportion of change (as can be seen in 
table 7). Correlations do not offer such possibility, except for computing the average of the 
coefficients. 
Despite its simplicity, the proportion of change is not without weaknesses. As we have 
discussed in chapter 1, small differences can be interpreted in several ways. The simple 
proportion of change implicitly assumes that all changes in opinions are meaningful. However, 
concerns have been raised against this reasoning. It has been argued that small changes can 
be products of measurement error (Achen, 1975). We may wish to account for this in some 
capacity, when computing to the proportion of change. 
One possibility is to only count changes of two points or higher as a real change of opinion. 
Consequently, if the answers given are the same or only differ by one point, compared to the 
previous measurement, we will treat it as if the opinion remained unchanged. As expected, 
this operation lowers the proportion of respondents who expressed a change of opinion, as 
can be seen in table 8. 
Table 8 - Corrected proportion of opinion change on the topic of the USA radar (Agenda setting study 2007) 
 
Between 1st and 2nd  
measurement 
Between 2nd and 3rd 
measurement 
Total 
Proportion of change 
(corrected) 




We can see that the prevalence of opinion instability has dropped to about a half of the 
original value. However, the portion of respondents who changed their opinion still remains 
at one fifth for changes between individual measurements and one third across the whole 
study. This demonstrates the point made in chapter 1, where I argued that even if we take 
into account the concerns about the reliability of questionnaires, a significant amount of 
opinion instability remains presents. And again, this is under the assumption of the classic 
measurement theory, that there exists a true score, which can be stable over time. Of course, 
one may argue that the +- 1 interval we used to define stable opinions is still too strict and 
that we may want to widen it o +- 2 or even further. However, this argument is problematic, 
since there is no logical threshold indicating, where the expansion of the interval should stop. 
After all, if we allow the move of two points across the scale to be treated as no change of 
opinion, why not allow three? Furthermore, the range of scales used in most questionnaires 
limits such operation, for a logical reason. The opinions on the American radar were measured 
on an 11 point scale. By treating changes by one point as a no opinion change, we allow the 
responds to move across approximately one fourth of the scale while still claiming to hold the 
same opinion as in the previous measurement. If we were to extend our tolerance to the 
movement by two points or less, the respondents would be able to cross almost half of the 
scale, while still being considered stable. This problem becomes more pressing as the range 
of the scale grows smaller. For a 7 point scale, it is advisable to not use more than 1 point 
version of the correction. 
Despite the above-mentioned problems, the proportion of change presents a simple and 
straightforward way to operationalize the prevalence of opinion instability. Its main strength 
lies in an easy substantial interpretation, which may reveal the true extent of opinion 
instability, hidden if expressed through correlation coefficient. As is the case with the use of 
correlation coefficients, we may worry about small changes in answers being results of 
unreliable measurement, instead of true opinion change. In such case, we may only consider 
changes of some magnitude to be significant enough for us to notice. However, this approach 
may be problematic when shorter scales are used, since it allows the respondents to move 
across a significant portion of the scale and still claim a stability of opinion. It may therefore 
be best if both simple and corrected proportions of change are used. For example, when it 
comes to the worries about the construction of American radar, our data shows that between 
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33 % and 60 % of respondents expressed opinion instability. This puts our data into the range 
of results reached by the previous studies using the same approach, which ranged from high 
twenties to low seventies. Note however, that this measure also includes respondents, who 
went thru a genuine change of opinion, i.e. those, who changed their opinion once during the 
study and kept this opinion long after the study changed. 
So far, the presented approaches took all opinion changes into account. This is of course a 
valid approach when researching the extent of opinion instability. However, in applied setting, 
not all changes of opinion are of equal importance. Based on the problem we are solving, we 
may only take into account some changes, the ones we deem important. For example, we may 
be concerned with the risk of public switching the majority vote during presidential elections. 
In such case, we would only be interested in voters switching between candidates, but not 
those, whose sympathies to one candidate varies but who would never vote for his 
competitor. To this end, we need to form a criterion, which will separate the changes of 
opinion into the substantial ones and the marginal ones. One possibility is to only consider an 
opinion change to be substantial, if the respondents cross the middle point of the scale. In our 
data, the scale ranged from 0 to 10. We are therefore only interested in respondents who 
responded with values smaller than 5 at the time of the first measurement, and a value of 5 
or higher at the time of second measurement, or vice versa. Additionally, respondents, who 
moved from or to the middle value of 5, are also considered to undergo a substantial change 
of opinion. This is because these respondents moved from a neutral vantage point to an end 
of the scale or vice versa, thus taking a stance on the issue. Note that this is only necessary for 
scale with odd number of responses. Scale with even number of responses can be simply cut 
in half. Nevertheless, if we focus only on the respondents who crossed the middle point of the 
scale, we will see a sharp decrease in the prevalence of opinion instability, as can be seen in 
table 9. 
Table 9 - Proportion of opinion change across scale centre on the topic of the USA radar 
(Agenda setting study 2007) 
 Between 1st and 2nd  
measurement 
Between 2nd and 3rd 
measurement 
Total 
Proportion of change 
(across the centre of the scale) 




While as many as 60 % of respondents exhibited some amount of opinion instability, only 
about one fifth of them crossed the middle point of the scale during the duration of the study. 
This paints the respondents in a more positive light. While many of them were not sure about 
how exactly they feel about the construction of the American radar, they at least made their 
minds on whether it would endanger the Czech republic or not. However, one may question 
the choice of the middle of the scale as a valid threshold for substantial opinion scale. Firstly, 
using the centre of the scale as a threshold makes sense only for bipolar scales. Secondly, if 
the distribution of the answers were to be heavily skewed, respondents might keep changing 
their opinions without ever coming close to the centre of the scale. This may be because real 
distribution of opinions is skewed, but it also may be because the scale do not properly cover 
the entire opinion spectrum (e.g. because of improper anchors or using a unimodal scale for 
a bimodal concept). Looking at graph 1, we can see that this is to some extent true for the 
concerns about the American radar. The distribution of the opinions is notably skewed to the 
left. The only exception to the trend is the popularity of the value of 5, indicating perhaps the 
ambiguity of opinions held by the respondents on the topic. The mean value of responses 
across all waves of measurement is approximately 6.5. It is therefore clear that the centre of 
the scale does not represent the centre of the distribution of the opinions. 
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Graph 1 - Level of concern about the US radar (Agenda setting study 2007) 
 
 
We may wish to account for this fact. We will repeat the same process of computing the 
substantial change, except we will not look for respondents who crossed the value of 5 
between the measurements, but instead for those who crossed the value of 6.5. This way, we 
can take the skewness, and potentially improper scale continuum, of the distribution into 
account. The results can be seen in table 10. 
Table 10 - Proportion of opinion change across distribution centre on the topic of the USA radar (Agenda setting study 2007) 
 Between 1st and 2nd  
measurement 
Between 2nd and 3rd 
measurement 
Total 
Proportion of change 
(across the centre of distribution) 
13 % 10 % 19 % 
 
We may interpret this table as the number of people who once held concerns of above 
average strength, but then their concerns fell to be below the average, or vice versa. In 
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comparison with the proportion of change across the centre of the scale, we see that there is 
a little difference. The proportions of change across individual measurements are more or less 
identical. Of interest may be the fact that the total proportion of change is higher when we 
use the centre of the distribution as a threshold for substantial opinion change. This indicates 
that there were more respondents who only switched sides once, in the case of change across 
the centre of distribution. 
As we have seen, if we were to not consider all changes of opinion as equal, but instead 
differentiated between substantial and marginal opinion change, we would get a much 
different result from our previous ones. The choice of threshold involves some ambiguity, e.g. 
what to do with odd numbered scales, and ideally should involve some domain knowledge, 
e.g. is the centre of the scale a good threshold? On the other hand, I would argue that the 
measurements of substantial change can be more useful in the applied research, coming back 
to our example from the beginning of this section, where we are concerned with the risk of 
public switching the majority vote during presidential elections, the research of such question 
should be based only on the presented definition of opinion change, because while the 
majority of citizens may exhibit opinion instability, most of them seem to be constrained into 
a specific set of responses. 
So far, we have considered opinion instability to essentially be binary in nature, i.e. one’s 
opinions either are unstable or not. However, these approaches have been reductive, in the 
sense that they do little to differentiate between various amounts of instability of inherent to 
the individuals. A more precise approach would be to compute the magnitude of opinion 
change for all respondents. Fortunately, panel data allows us to do this easily. We can simply 
compute this discrepancy as the difference between responses across different 
measurements. These differences are best expressed visually, as can be seen in graph 2. Note 
that the graph only shows the difference between the second and first measurement. 
However, the distribution of differences between the second and the third measurement does 








In all three instances, slightly more than a half of the respondents gave the same response as 
during the previous measurement. This correspondents with the results we got when we 
computed the proportion of change. Furthermore, we can see that changes are more or less 
equally distributed around the centre. This is why the difference between the means may not 
be the approach to measure opinion instability, as it will hide these symmetrical changes. If 
we wished to summarize the amount of opinion instability expressed as the difference 
between measurements, we have several possibilities. The first is to simply compute the 
average absolute difference. The average absolute difference between the first and second 
measurement is circa equal to 1. The same goes for the difference between the third and the 
first measurement. Only the difference between the second and the third measurement is 
lower, with the average value of 0.75. We can therefore say that on average, respondents 
changed their responses on the American radar question by one point or less. This provides a 
simple interpretation, however analytically, we may be more interested in the respondents 




whose opinions underwent a more radical change. This leads us to the second option for 
summarizing the differences between measurements and that is the average squared 
difference. In principle, similar to the concept of variance, the average squared difference 
gives a bigger weight to the respondents who exhibited a more radical change of opinion. The 
average squared difference may lack a straightforward interpretation, but it provides a better 
alternative for comparing the opinion change across groups or topics. Full results of this 
approach, measuring opinion instability, can be seen in table 11. 
Table 11 - The difference between opinions about American radar (Agenda setting study 2007) 
 Between 1st and 2nd 
measurement 
Between 2nd and 3rd 
measurement 
Between 3rd and 1st 
measurement 
Avg. abs. difference 0.95 0.75 1 
Avg. squared difference 3.1 2 3.2 
 
Despite the possibility of expressing the differences using the summary statistics, I would 
argue against such practice. The main strength of expressing opinion instability as the 
difference between measurements is in its ability to estimate the extent of opinion instability 
for individual respondents. This is especially beneficial if we want to not only estimate the 
prevalence of opinion instability in the population but are also planning to follow this estimate 
with more detailed statistical modelling. This approach for measuring opinion instability is 
therefore best suited for studies interested in the factors affecting the presence of opinion 
instability. 
By now, we have seen a number of possible approaches for operationalizing opinion 
instability. Many of these approaches are commonly used by the studies interested in the 
topic. We have also seen that the choice of operational definition of opinion instability has a 
drastic effect on the produced results. In fact, the differences in methodology probably 
account for more differences in results across studies than the choice of topic or the time gap 
between measurements. If our goal is to estimate the prevalence of opinion instability in the 
public, we must first establish a cohesive framework for its measurement, which would remain 
unchanged across studies. 
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Graph 2 - Opinion instability operationalization scheme 
 
There are two basic approaches to operationalization of opinion instability. The first one 
measures instability in aggregate level, the second on the individual level. The aggregate level 
approaches are notable for their flexibility, as they don’t necessarily rely on repeated 
measures of the same units and can be applied to cross-sectional data. On the other hand, 
due to the nature of aggregation, these approaches suffer from the inability to distinguish 
individual changes of opinions and may present the opinions of respondents as more stable 
than they actually are. This is especially true for the difference between means and the 
difference between proportions approaches. The correlation coefficients do not suffer from 
this problem. On the other hand, correlations lack a simple substantial interpretation. 
Remember from our examples, that high coefficients of correlation do not necessarily indicate 
a nonexistence of substantial group of respondents with unstable opinions. 
The approaches based on individual level measurement offer a more precise way for 
estimating opinion instability. The drawback is the necessity of repeated measurement on the 
same respondents, i.e. use of the panel design. This drawback is however compensated by 
results that are both more accurate and easier to interpret. The proportion of change, both 
simple and corrected, represents the best approaches when we are interested in opinion 
instability in general. If we are interested in a more specific case, such risk of the public 
changing their collective opinion on some issue, the approaches based on crossing the centre 
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are more appropriate. Lastly, if the continuous approach is preferable for statistical modelling, 
as numeric variables are easier to handle. 
Coming back to our overall results in table 12, we see varying results. Some, such as the 
correlation coefficients or average distances, indicate relatively small amount of instability. 
Other, such as the proportions of change, paint a more concerning picture. However, the 
numbers alone cannot tell us if the amount of opinion instability is high or low. Such evaluation 
requires a reference point, which can be gained only by knowing the context, in which the 
opinion was formed. 
Graph 12 - Prevalence of opinion instability on the topic of the USA radar (Agenda setting study 2007) 
 Between 1st and 2nd 
measurement 
Between 2nd and 3rd 
measurement 
Between 3rd and 
1st measurement 
Correlation 0.83 0.90 0.83 
Corrected correlation 0,87 1 0.87 
Simple proportion of change 45 % 41 %  
Corrected proportion of change 23 % 19 %  
Proportion of change across 
centre of the scale 
16 % 7 %  
Proportion of change across 
centre of the distribution 
13 % 10 %  
Avg. absolute difference 0.95 0.75 1 
Avg. squared difference 3.1 2 3.2 
 
3.4. Role of context in interpreting the prevalence of opinion instability 
Is opinion instability a problem? In this and previous chapters, we have seen that most people 
do not dispute that opinion instability exists to at least some extent. The dispute is instead 
centred on the severity of the problem. In the data on the topic of the American radar, we 
have seen that about 10 % of respondents crossed either the centre of the scale or the centre 
of the distribution. Some may argue that the inability of tenth of the population to hold a 
stable opinion on such a high profile issue for more than a few months present a serious 
problem to the democratic practice. Others may respond that 10 % of population presents but 
a small minority, as it implies that 90 % of citizens stayed on the same side of the argument. 
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Both of these arguments can be correct, as the answers depend on the topic in question. To 
demonstrate that prevalence of instability as low 10 % can still be a problem, we may take a 
look at the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum. 
The United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, commonly known as Brexit, 
took place on the 23rd of June 2016. It was then, when the citizens of United Kingdom decided 
to no longer be a part of the European Union. This referendum provides an ideal example for 
the demonstration of the potential impact of opinion instability. Referendums represent the 
purest form of the democratic practice, as the citizens can directly steer the future of their 
nation. This also means that all strengths and weaknesses of the public opinion will be present 
in the full force. Furthermore, Brexit is a high profile and controversial topic, which is of 
interest to all inhabitants of the UK and will influence lives of the future generations both in 
the UK and beyond. 
As the reader may know, Brexit to some extent represents a black spot in the history of opinion 
polling. As most polls showed the remain camp to be in lead (BBC, 2016; Financial Times, 
2016), the win of the Leave option surprised many. Because of this unforeseen development, 
pre-referendum polls are publicly considered to by failures (e.g. Barnes, 2016; Duncan, 2016; 
Saiidi, 2016). The reasons for this error are still under scrutiny, with unrepresentative 
telephone surveys (Clarke & Goodwin, 2016) and herding (Fry & Brint, 2017) being among the 
prime suspects. What the pollster did not get wrong was the closeness of the race. For 
majority of the time, the British public was almost evenly split between leaving and remaining 
in the EU. This can be seen in graph 4, which shows the difference between the number of 
people preferring to remain in the EU and those, who would prefer leaving (in percentage 
points). The data points represent individual polls, gathered by the BBC Brexit poll tracker. 
Details about the data can be seen in chapter 1. I also added a loess curve to better visualize 
the trend across time. 
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Graph 3 - Difference between the Remain and Leave supporters on Brexit (BBC Brexit poll tracker 2016) 
 
As we can see, the difference between the Remain and the Leave camps was on average never 
more than ten percentage points. In fact, as the time of the referendum drew close, the gap 
in the size of the groups shrank. At the day of the referendum, the difference was less than 
five percentage points. Now, we may imagine that there were about 10 % of citizens, the same 
amount as on the topic of the America radar, whose opinion on the topic were unstable and 
changed erratically. It now becomes clear, that even if the pollsters were able to completely 
eradicate any and all measurement errors, there would still be a considerable amount of 
uncertainty about the results, due to the unstable nature of opinions. In fact, even if the 
citizens with unstable opinions represented only 5 % of population, they could still influence 
the results, if their opinion did not change randomly, but instead reacted in a systemic pattern, 
e.g. if these people got swayed by the latest news. In such situation, a swing of several 
percentage points would not be an unrealistic development. 
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We have now seen that the context matters greatly, when evaluating the extent of opinion 
instability. The case of the American radar presents a case, where the practical implication of 
the opinion instability is small. Not only was the distribution of the opinion heavily skewed, 
with most respondents being wary of the radar, but the public did not have a direct say in the 
matter. Since the public opinion here served only as a guide for the political actors, a small 
group of citizens with unstable opinion did not represent a big issue. 
The situation with Brexit is however completely reversed. Not only the topic was highly 
controversial, with either group only ever leading by a very small margin, but the will of the 
people was also taken to be bounding in a political sense. This means that the opinions of the 
public, even of the small groups in the public, mattered greatly. In such case, even a group as 
small as one tenth of the population may have a considerable impact on the outcome. And if 
members of such group cannot hold a consistent opinion for a longer period of time, even on 
a high profile issue as Brexit, then the opinion instability presents a severe issue for political 




4. Nature of opinion instability 
In previous chapters, we have covered the questions of existence and prevalence of opinion 
instability. Perhaps the most intriguing question is the nature of opinion instability. We have 
seen that the extent of opinion instability varies significantly across topics and populations. 
The question then becomes why. Such question may be approached from various angles. 
Some may consider characteristics of individuals, others the context, in which the opinions 
were formed. I will describe three models aiming at explaining opinion instability. These 
models have been developed and scrutinized for several decades and in all three of them, 
opinion instability is mainly rooted in characteristics of individuals. This will allow us to 
compare the models mentioned and look for both, similarities and differences. In the end, we 
will hopefully discover a clear pattern of the most important factors, determining opinion 
instability. The models presented here are the Black-and-white model (Converse, 1964), the 
Receive-Accept-Sample model (J. Zaller, 1994) and the Elaboration likelihood model of 
persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
Lastly, this chapter also takes a somewhat different form from the previous ones. In the 
preceding chapters, I strived to provide as much empirical examples of the presented topics 
as possible. However, an empirical test or even an illustration of the presented models would 
require rather fine data, gathered specifically for this purpose. Unfortunately, no such dataset 
is available for my purpose. This chapter and its conclusion will therefore be mostly 
theoretical. 
4.1. Black-and-White model (BW model) 
First of the reviewed models is the Black-and-White model (Converse, 1964). This was perhaps 
the first attempt to not just describe the instability of opinions but also discover its origin. We 
have already encountered Converse’s work numerous times in this thesis, however up until 
now, we have only focused on his descriptive work. Now we may finally also examine how he 
and his followers explained the origins of opinion instability. Before we do this, we will look 
into how the BW model understands the instability of opinions. 
In the understanding of opinion instability, the BW model went through two phases. The first 
phase, which is the original BW model as defined by Converse, opinion instability was 
understood in a strictly binary way. The original BW model argued that citizens can be divided 
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into parts. Those who hold substantial and meaningful opinions on a specific topic and those, 
who do not. The former group can thus express opinion consistency across both topics and 
time. Naturally, people without substantial opinions give essentially random answers, when 
asked for input. These random, false expressions of preference are called non-attitudes. The 
original BW model argued that most individuals hold non-attitudes on most issues. This 
understanding of the opinion formation process is rather strict, as it implicitly assumes that 
individuals who hold substantial opinions, store these opinions in their mind at all times and 
are invariant to context. However, this understanding of opinions and their instability has 
been criticized (Achen, 1975; Taylor, 1983). As a result, the BW model has been revised. 
Opinions are no longer understood as discrete phenomena, but instead as existing on a 
continuum (Brody, 1986; Hill, 2001). In practice this means that even the holders of substantial 
opinions may to a lesser extent exhibit opinion instability, as their expressed opinions change 
with the context of the questioning. Still, the concept of non-attitudes remains, as according 
to the BW model, many if not most people do not hold cohesive opinions. 
What is then the main difference between those, who can hold substantial opinions and those, 
who cannot? There are two central concepts, through which the BW model explains opinion 
instability: constraints and belief systems. “The belief systems are to be understood as a 
configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form 
of constraint or functional interdependence” (Converse, 1964, p. 3). As for the constraint, the 
BW model offers two definitions: a static one and a dynamic one. In the static case, constraints 
are defined as “the success we would have in predicting, given initial knowledge that an 
individual holds a specified attitude, that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes”  
(Converse, 1964, p. 3). In less technical terms, static constraints are a system of opinion’s 
valence on an interconnected topic. This interconnection allows us to infer individual’s opinion 
on one topic from their opinion on another one. For example, if an individual holds a right-
wing opinion on taxation, we should be able to infer their (right wing) opinion on social 
services. On the other hand, constraints in the dynamic sense refer to “the probability that a 
change in the perceived status (truth, desirability, and so forth) of one idea-element would 
psychologically require, from the point of view of the actor, some compensating change(s) in 
the status of idea-elements elsewhere in the configuration” (Converse, 1964, p. 3). This means 
that if one’s opinion on taxation changes, so should in a congruent way all other related topics. 
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As we can see, the main function of constraints is to limit the range of opinions individuals can 
hold on any given issue. Individuals with tighter constraints will have more cohesive and 
predictable opinions, both across topics and across time. On the other hand, the opinion of 
people with looser constraints will be much freer to vary. 
The strength of constraints are therefore the main determinant of opinion stability, or the lack 
of thereof. At the same time, the strength of constraints varies across individuals. The BW 
model recognizes three sources of constraints. The first source of these sources is logical. As 
it happens, some topics have an inner logic, which by itself should limit the range of possible 
opinions an individual can hold. Strictly speaking, it would be illogical for one to be both 
against market intervention by the state and in favour of the nationalization of private 
property. However, this strict logic is not  necessarily true for all people (Campbell, Converse, 
Miller, & Stokes, 1980). In fact, in the Czech post-election study from 2013 the correlation 
between the opinions on the market intervention by the state and the opinion about 
privatization of state property has the value of 0.27. As we can see, while there is some level 
of constraint, the relatively low correlation coefficients reveal a great deal of variability in the 
answers. This fact can be more clearly seen in table 13, presenting collapsed answers to the 
two questions. The originally ten points scales were recoded so that the left side of the scale 
formed one category, the right side formed second and the middle of the scale formed third. 
Ideally, all responses should lie on the diagonal, indicating perfect congruence between 
opinions on privatization and state interventions. This is clearly not the case, as 57 % of 
respondents, who do not believe that state should intervene into the market, ale do not 
believe that state should get rid of its property and companies. 
Table 13 – Congruence on economic issues, row percentages (Post-election study 2013) 
 Don't privatize state 
property 
Neutral Privatize state 
property 
State should intervene 77% 11% 12% 
Neutral 59% 22% 19% 




 This fact illustrates that the respondents do not seem to be particularly wary about the inner 
workings of these topics. However, the inner logic of the topics is not the only source of 
opinion constraints. 
The second source of constraints is a psychological one. This source essentially represents 
stereotypes and other heuristic strategies used to form opinions. An example of such 
constraint would be to hold the same opinion about two politicians from the same party. 
Despite not knowing anything about the personalities or actions of those politicians, one may 
form a similar opinion about both simply from their party allegiance. The psychological 
sources of constraints do not need to follow strict logical rules, i.e. it is possible for an 
individual to hold contradicting information in their mind. These heuristics does not even have 
to be correct, as in they do not necessarily reflect reality. Despite this, they can still provide a 
constraining effect on the way individuals see the world. 
Lastly, and for us most importantly, there are social sources of constraints. The social sources 
of constraints are twofold. First are what we can call ideologies, i.e. systems of opinions 
interconnected through a coherent and well-developed world view. These ideologies are 
unique in the sense that they provide a set of strong constraints shared between large 
amounts of people. As such, they provide both a helpful orientation point for common citizens 
and rallying points for political elites. From an analytical point of view, they also provide 
efficient predictors of political behaviour. Examples of such ideologies would be conservatism 
or left-wing political orientation. However, not all social sources of constraints take the form 
of deeply thought out ideologies. The second social source is what the BW model calls “what 
goes with what”. This can be understood as the so-called common knowledge of relationship 
between concepts, held by the population. As opposite to the ideologies, this common 
knowledge does not provide an explanation of why certain topics or ideas are connected, but 
simply the information that such connection exists. Thus, individuals may know that the 
communist party is atheist, despite not understanding why. Nevertheless, such information 
may be used as a clue for the voters of said party, for example when forming opinions on 
topics of church reparations. 
These were the sources of the opinion constraints. The actual strength of these constraints is 
determined primarily by two factors, the centrality of the topic and its level of abstraction. 
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The centrality refers to the relative importance of the topic to the individual, compared to all 
others. Opinions on more central topics are expected to be more stable. This intuitively seems 
to hold true. However, the BW model does not provide a theoretical explanation why the 
centrality should be associated with stability. Instead, it just provides a rather circular 
explanation that “the element more likely to change is defined as less central to the belief 
system” (Converse, 1964, p. 4). Despite this blind spot, the idea that people will hold stronger 
and more stable opinions on topics they are more invested in, seems intuitive enough. The 
second factor of constraint’s strength is the level of abstraction of the topics in question. While 
some topics are close and well-known to the individuals, such as local problems of their 
hometown, other topics are exceedingly abstract and remote, such as the case with 
international politics. While the abstract nature of some topics can hardly be blamed, it 
presents a significant challenge to the individual, especially those without expert knowledge 
of the topic. It is worth noting that political ideologies by themselves represent a rather 
abstract and distant construct, which makes their handling difficult. Consequently, while they 
can be used as a source of opinion constraints, they may not be available to some or even 
most individuals. This is unfortunate, as ideologies provide a cohesive and logically consistent 
worldview. People without the ability to make use of them, are instead forced to rely on less 
precise sources. Most of these sources are heuristic in nature. People who are unable to use 
political ideologies may use a wide range of surrogates, such as party affiliation of the group 
proposing a solution to the topic (Haider‐Markel & Joslyn, 2001; Tedin, 1986), personal values 
(Craig et al., 2005; Urban & Pfenning, 2000) or even an emotion they feel considering the topic 
(Sobkowicz, 2012). Converse (1964) himself argued that the main orientation point are social 
groups. More specifically, when people need to form an opinion on a problem or its solution, 
they often tend to think about what social group would benefit from it. Depending on which 
groups come to their mind and how the individual feels about them, they will form a 
corresponding opinion. If a larger number of groups is involved, the individual may remember 
different ones each time they are asked for an opinion, leading to a difference in expressed 
opinion.  
It is also important to note that the BW model does not consider formal education or political 
orientation. In fact, the model argues strictly against it (Brody, 1986; Converse, 1964). While 
political orientation may in some cases be used as an indicator of which topics are to be 
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considered central and thus be to same extent used as a predictor of opinion instability, formal 
education has no such connection. Converse (1964) argues the illusion of higher education 
being associated with higher opinion stability comes from the overrepresentation of university 
graduates among the political elites. These political elites tend to possess expert knowledge 
for relevant topics, thus making their opinion both more stable and cohesive. However, most 
university graduates lack this knowledge, which from the point of opinion stability makes 
them no different from the less educated groups. 
Unfortunately, the Black-and-White model never undertook a significant theoretical 
development, as far as the causes of opinion instability go. Perhaps because of rather 
controversial implications of Converse’s original work, most of the following studies were 
focused on replicating the results of the prevalence of opinion instability. Thus, the rather 
technical debate has been centred around different ways of operationalizing opinion change 
and the effect they have on the results. Meanwhile, the debate about the nature of opinion 
formation process and its implication for instability. Despite this, the Black-and-White model 
played a key role in the history of opinion instability research and served as an inspiration for 
other models, including the Receive-Accept-Sample model. 
4.2. Receive-Accept-Sample model (RAS model) 
As is the case with other theories presented within this thesis, the Receive-Accept-Sample 
model wasn’t originally intended to solely explain opinion instability. In the first place, it is an 
attempt to provide explanation of how the responses to survey questions are formed and, by 
extension, how the public opinion is developed (J. R. Zaller, 1992). 
Under the RAS model, people do not hold stable, cohesive opinions about issues in their minds 
all the time. Instead, they store considerations, which can be understood as “any reason that 
might induce an individual to decide a political issue one way or the other” (J. R. Zaller, 1992, 
p. 40). These considerations may be either cognitive or affective in nature and can take almost 
any form, including for example “Membership in EU helps our economy”, “Immigration quotas 
are unfair” or “My father doesn’t like the president”. 
Any individual may hold a vast number of potentially incongruent considerations in their 
memory without even thinking about their contradicting nature. Inevitably, individuals will 
encounter a situation demanding from them to provide a clear-cut opinion on a specific topic. 
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These situations may range from participating in an opinion poll to casting a ballot in 
parliament election. In situations like these, the individual will retrieve a set of considerations 
relevant to the topic from memory, sum them up and, based on this summation, express their 
opinion. As an example, the answer to the question whether the Czech Republic should leave 
or stay in the European Union depends on how many positive and negative considerations 
regarding EU can an individual retrieve from their memory. Note that under the RAS model, 
the process of opinion formation is probabilistic in nature. This means that the more 
consideration supporting specific opinion an individual retrieves from their mind, the more 
likely they are to accept the said opinion as their own. However, unless the entire 
consideration is in support of one opinion, a certain amount of instability remains. 
Consequently, even if the process of opinion formation and its context is the same, it may lead 
to two different outcomes. 
However, not every relevant consideration is guaranteed to be extracted from memory when 
an opinion is needed. Furthermore, not all of them have an equal probability of being 
retrieved. Thus, when retrieving considerations from memory, only a sample of them will be 
used in the opinion formation process. To complicate the matter further, not every 
consideration an individual encounters in their life has a guaranteed chance to be stored in 
their memory. There are therefore two main bottlenecks in the opinion formation process: 
which considerations will be stored in the memory and which will be retrieved when called. 
The factors governing probability of each consideration being stored and retrieved were 
summed by Zaller (1992, p. 58) into four axioms: 
1) Reception axiom: The greater the level of cognitive engagement with an issue, the more 
likely he or she is to be exposed to and comprehend – in a word, to receive – political messages 
concerning that issue. 
2) Resistance axiom: People tend to resist arguments that are inconsistent with their political 
predispositions, but they do so only to the extent the contextual information necessary to 
perceive a relationship between the message and their predisposition. 
3) Accessibility axiom: The more recently a consideration has been called to mind or thought 
about, the less time it takes to retrieve that consideration or related considerations from 
memory and bring them to the top of the head for use. 
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4) Response axiom: Individuals answer survey questions by answering across the 
considerations that are immediately salient or accessible to them. 
We may summarize the axioms presented above into two general factors contributing to the 
probability of consideration being stored and retrieved: personal attributes of the individual 
and the context in which the opinion is created. The first factor is concerned mainly with the 
knowledge of topic the individual possesses, known in the terminology of the RAS model as 
cognitive engagement. The RAS model argues that people with better topic knowledge are 
not only able to recognize that a piece of information is connected to the topic of question, 
thus having bigger number of considerations stored, but also can understand whether this 
information is congruent with their political predispositions. As people tend to reject 
information clashing with their predisposition, more knowledgeable individuals tend to have 
their memory filled with considerations more homogenous in nature. This will in turn lead 
them to have more cohesive and stable opinions, even if the said opinion has to be 
reconstructed every time they are requested. 
The second factor is concerned with the effect of context. By that, the RAS model understands 
the previous experience an individual had with the topic, such as the content of newspapers 
they read or the conversations with their friends about a certain topic the day before. If the 
content or the frame of the topic as presented by the media or other sources changes, 
individuals with a less homogenous set of considerations will also experience opinion change, 
as the probabilities of each consideration being retrieved start to differ. However, the second 
factor also includes a more immediate context of the opinion formation process. The process 
of retrieval of consideration can also be affected by the person asking for the opinion, the 
environment where the questioning takes place and, in case of opinion surveys, the order in 
which questions are asked. With so many variables, it is reasonable to assume that the exact 
context of situation is almost impossible to replicate and thus the opinion formation process 
will almost never be the same. 
So far, we used the RAS model to describe the process of opinion formation. It can however 
also be used to explain the existence of instability of opinions. The core of opinion instability 
lies in the process of consideration sampling at the moment of opinion formation. Since 
people do not possess fixed opinions on any topic, the opinions are always required to be built 
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from scratch. However, as the sampling process is random in nature, it is very possible for the 
same individual to create two very different samples of consideration. These different samples 
will encourage the individual to take different stances on the issue. This is further exaggerated 
by the fact that the number of considerations, as well as the probability of each consideration 
being sampled, changes over time. With such number of changing variables playing role in the 
process, it is not surprising that one individual may express a contradicting opinion in a short 
amount of time. However, as we have seen in the previous chapters, the extent of opinion 
instability varies between individuals. 
Based on the description of the RAS model above, we can see that the individuals with higher 
level of topic knowledge tend to reject considerations incongruent with their political 
predisposition. This leads to the content of their memory being more homogenous in nature, 
as it is not “contaminated” by consideration going against their political orientation. Said 
homogeneity in turn leads to the samples of considerations created across time to be more 
similar with each other. This similarity makes it more likely that the individual in question will 
keep the same opinion over a wider range of time. Thus, the knowledge of topics provides a 
safeguard against opinion instability.  
Similarly to the Black-and-White model, the RAS model does not place a particular focus on 
formal education, instead it focuses on knowledge. According to the model, there is also no 
causal relationship between opinion stability and the interest in the topic in question. While 
we may assume that people interested in the topic may have a more stable opinion on it, 
previous studies show that merely being interested in the topic doesn’t directly raise the level 
of opinion stability (Saris & Sniderman, 2004; J. Zaller, 1994). While we may find a positive 
correlation between interest and stability of opinions, this is most likely a spurious relationship 
mediated by the knowledge of topic, i.e. people interested in a topic also tend to be more 
knowledgeable about it. Turning to the topic of context, the way topics are framed 
significantly influences the opinion of recipients (Baden, 2008; Haider‐Markel & Joslyn, 2001; 
Hansen, 2007). This is because, as we have discussed before, the change of context will change 
the sampling probabilities of considerations carried by individuals. As long, as there is a single 
unchanging frame through which the topic is presented, the opinions of the people should 
remain mostly stable. On the other hand, in a situation, where there are several competing 
frames or several frames in quick succession, the prevalence of opinion instability will raise. 
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Interestingly, some previous research suggests that the effect of context may overcome the 
effect of individual characteristics (Dobrzynska & Blais, 2007, 2009), such as when the topic in 
question is of the highest importance. 
As opposite to the BW model, which remained concerned mainly with measuring the 
prevalence of opinion instability, the RAS model provides a chance for deeper understanding. 
Unburdened by the debate on the reliability of measurement, the RAS model went through 
ample development (e.g. Friedman, 2016; Saris & Sniderman, 2004; J. Zaller, 2012; J. R. Zaller, 
1998). However, most of this development was focused on the process of opinion formation 
and questions such as how and where the considerations are created. This is understandable, 
as this was the main purpose of the RAS model. On the other hand, it does mean that the topic 
of opinion instability remained on the side-lines. 
4.3. Elaboration likelihood model of persuasion (ELM model) 
Both previously presented models originate from the fields of sociology and political science. 
However, the topics of opinion formation and opinion change are also unsurprisingly 
prominent in the field of social psychology. One of the most well-known psychological models 
focusing on opinion change is the Elaboration likelihood model of persuasion (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). This model is not only an attempt to explain the process of persuasion but 
can also be an inspiration for the study of opinion instability. 
The core idea of the model is that there are two ways of processing information, which lead 
to opinion change. Note that in the ELM model, in congruence with psychological literature, 
opinions are called attitudes and defined as “general evaluations people hold in regard to 
themselves, other people, objects, and issues” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p. 127). This definition 
does not place special focus on opinions existing on either discrete or continuous spectrum. 
In fact, such distinction is not relevant for the model. We may think of the opinion, or 
attitudes, as continuous in nature, to preserve the congruency with previous models. There is 
however one major difference between the ELM model and the previous models. The ELM 
model does not question the existence of opinions and the ability of individuals to store said 
opinions inside their minds. However, the ELM model still accepts that opinions may be 
unstable and changing rapidly. As we will see, even though the nature of opinions differs 
across the presented models, there exists a surprising congruence between them. 
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As mentioned, there are two routes, through which an individual may evaluate specific topic: 
the central route and the peripheral route. In the central route, the individual carefully 
scrutinizes information presented to him considering certain topics. The individual goes into 
great detail to evaluate all information and forms an opinion only after intense consideration. 
On the other hand, if the individual opts for the peripheral route, they do not base their 
opinion on the evaluation of the argument themselves, but instead base their opinion on 
contextual clues. For example, the topic may be evaluated based on the perceived 
trustworthiness or attractiveness of the source of arguments or on according to the previous 
experience with a similar situation. The opinions produced by these two routes are 
qualitatively different, since the ones produced by the central route are more elaborated in 
nature. The primary objective of the model is to estimate the likelihood that an individual will 
choose the central route of persuasion and produce an elaborated opinion, hence the name 
of the model. How exactly are they different and how an individual decides, which route to 
take, is described by the seven postulates of the ELM model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986): 
1. People are motivated to hold correct attitudes. 
2. Although people want to hold correct attitudes, the amount and nature of issue-
relevant elaboration in which people are willing or able to engage to evaluate a 
message vary with individual and situational factors. 
3. Variables can affect the amount and direction of attitude change by: (A) serving as 
persuasive arguments, (B) serving as peripheral cues, and/or (C) affecting the extent 
or direction of issue and argument elaboration. 
4. Affecting motivation and/or ability to process a message in a relatively objective 
manner can do so by either enhancing or reducing argument mutiny 
5. As motivation and/or ability to process arguments is decreased, peripheral cues 
become relatively more important determinants of persuasion. Conversely, as 
argument scrutiny is increased, peripheral cues become relatively less important 
determinants of persuasion. 
6. Variables affecting message processing in a relatively biased manner can produce 
either a positive (favourable) or negative (unfavourable) motivational and/or ability 
bias to the issue-relevant thoughts attempted. 
7. Attitude changes that result mostly from processing issue-relevant arguments 
(central route) will show greater temporal persistence, greater prediction of 
behaviour, and greater resistance to counter-persuasion than attitude changes that 




Since the postulates are numerous and their meaning may not be apparently obvious, we may 
benefit from taking a closer look. The starting premise of the ELM model is that people want 
to hold correct opinions. Obviously, the extent to which an opinion is considered to be correct 
or incorrect varies between individuals and is therefore highly subjective. Nevertheless, the 
point of the ELM model is that people want to hold opinions that they themselves consider 
correct. However, the proper evaluation of opinions, i.e. the central route of persuasion, 
demands a great deal of time and skill. Consequently, some individuals may not be willing or 
able to spend such significant amount of resources and instead try to approximate the correct 
opinion based on contextual cues, i.e. take the peripheral route of persuasion. The opinions 
produced by the central route are shown to be more stable and logically cohesive than the 
opinions produced by the peripheral route. Here lies the source of opinion instability as 
derived from the ELM model: opinions produced by careful deliberation of arguments are 
more stable than opinions produced by the heuristic process. This is supposedly because when 
going through the central route, the individual prepares arguments surrounding the topic. 
These arguments serve not only as the basis for the formation of an opinion in the first place 
but can be used later as a defence against counter-opinions, which would otherwise sway the 
individual and lead to opinion instability. Therefore, the main factor influencing whether an 
individual’s exhibited opinion instability is the nature of the opinion process they undertook. 
The question then becomes, which factors influence the choice between the central and the 
peripheral route. 
According to the ELM model, there are two main necessities for taking the central route of 
persuasion: the motivation to get invested in the topic and sufficient cognitive abilities to 
evaluate the presented arguments. The question of motivation is a relatively simple one. The 
more interested individuals are about a topic, the more likely they are to delve deep into the 
presented arguments. Furthermore, highly motivated individuals put more care into 
differentiating between strong and weak arguments, thus raising the probability of producing 
a stable opinion. Interest however is not the sole source of motivation. Perceived 
responsibility also raises motivation. Therefore, framing the topic as personal responsibility of 
the individual will increase their motivation to produce an elaborated opinion. However, 
motivation by itself is not sufficient. An individual may be highly motivated to go through the 
central route of persuasion yet be unable to do so because of their lack of ability to 
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comprehend the topic at hand. Topics naturally vary in their complexity and not all of them 
are accessible to everyone. In the case of highly complex and abstract topics, which are not 
uncommon in the fields of politics, it is very possible that most individuals will have to rely on 
contextual clues, thus exposing them to a greater danger of opinion instability. A major factor 
is the previous knowledge of topic an individual possesses. Those with more topic knowledge 
will be able to utilize in the process of argument consideration, thus allowing for more 
elaborate and stable opinion. Furthermore, once an opinion has been formed, the topic 
knowledge can be used to counter following persuasion attempts, thus raising the stability of 
opinions in question. Note that the held opinion may not necessarily be correct, since it may 
be a product of biased reasoning, but it will nevertheless be stable (Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 
1975). 
The elaboration, and consequently the stability, of opinion is not however determined only by 
individual attributes. Environmental factors may also be in play. One factor, which has already 
been mentioned, is the complexity of the topic. Since less complex topics require lesser 
amount of cognitive skills and time to evaluate, we may expect the opinions on them to be 
more stable on average, and vice versa. Furthermore, if arguments about specific topic 
solutions are framed as novel, unique or related to the values important to the individuals, 
they are more likely to have an impact (Petty & Briñol, 2010) and thus may lead to opinion 
instability. Lastly, there is the factor of repetition. Here the effect is not considered to be so 
straightforward. Under the ELM model, the effect of repetition of specific message exists in 
two phases. In the first phase, repeated encounters with the message provide the individual 
with more opportunities to process the message and understand its content. Therefore, even 
the individuals who lack sufficient cognitive skills to understand the information in one sitting 
will eventually be able to decipher its content, thus raising the elaboration and stability of the 
formed opinion. For example, if some topic received an intense and consistently framed 
coverage from the media, the prevalence of opinion instability on this topic would be lower. 
However, the effect of repetition may be negative in the second phase. If specific messages 
or arguments are repeated even after people had enough time to consider their content, the 
individuals may grow annoyed or bored by them and not provide them with any significant 
amount of attention, instead relying on contextual clues, as a quicker and easier way of 
opinion formation, consequently leading to on average less stable opinions. 
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The ELM model has become one of the most popular models of persuasion (Chaiken & Trope, 
1999) and provides a significant insight into the nature of opinion instability. However, we 
must remember that its main focus is on the deliberate persuasion. Because of this, most of 
the previous research has been on the central route of persuasion, the elaborated opinions 
stemming from it and the ways they can be changed (e.g. Bhattacherjee & Sanford, 2006; Cho, 
1999; Petty, Briñol, Priester, Briñol, & Priester, 2009). The peripheral route and the less stable 
opinions it produces were of lesser interest. Nevertheless, we may benefit from the insight 
the ELM model provides when combined with the information from the previously described 
models. 
4.5. Synthesis of presented models 
We have seen three models providing insight into the nature of opinion instability. While all 
of the presented models approach the subject differently, there is also a significant amount 
of overlaps and similarities between them. These similarities are of the utmost importance to 
us, since the fact that they arise despite different starting points of individual models serves 
as the proof of their validity. However, before we delve deeper into the common points of the 
models, let’s examine their difference. 
First of all, there is no consensus on the nature of opinions themselves. While the ELM model 
treats opinions as constructs held constantly in the minds of individuals, the BW model argues 
that the nature of opinions is not constant across all individuals. While there are some 
individuals, who hold stable and cohesive opinions, a potentially large part of the population 
does not hold any opinion on a significant number of topics. Instead, these individuals express 
the so-called non-attitudes. The RAS model takes this notion even further and argues that the 
concept of opinions as long-term constructs  is entirely false and that opinions are best 
understood as an ambivalent set of considerations, given form only for as long as is needed to 
provide answer to a given question. None of the models provides better evidence for its claim 
than others, but it is possible that none of them is correct. The question of true nature of 
opinions is still open and it is unlikely to be solved in the near future. 
Furthermore, the models do not even agree on the nature of opinion instability. For the ELM 
model, opinion instability is a product of the inability of individuals to resist persuasive 
messages they encounter. Individuals, who are more capable to resist persuasion attempts 
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are those, whose opinion are more stable. The implication also is that the origin of opinion 
instability is on the outside of individual’s mind. If no persuasion took place, the opinions 
should be perfectly stable. Meanwhile, the RAS model sees opinion instability as a product of 
ambivalence individuals hold to the topics in question. The instability of opinions occurs when 
one’s mind is filled with conflicting considerations, as well as when the sampling probabilities 
of these contradicting considerations change over time due to the change of context. 
Therefore, several ways opinion instability can be avoided. The first possibility is to avoid 
encountering any conflicting considerations. For example, if an individual lived in an extremely 
homogenous environment, i.e. everyone in their vicinity and all their sources of information 
would hold the same opinions, said individual would have no opportunity to accept conflicting 
considerations into their mind. This is obviously a very unlikely possibility. The second 
possibility is to not accept any conflicting consideration into one’s mind. If the person in 
question would be capable of rejecting all considerations, which does not align with their 
political predispositions, their mind would not be contaminated with conflicting information. 
Consequently, all formed opinions would be the same, no matter the specific sample of 
considerations used in their creation. However, once conflicting considerations are stored in 
one’s mind, opinion instability will always be a possibility. It therefore naturally follows, that 
the extent of opinion instability is the function of the ability to filter conflicting considerations. 
It also implies that the sources of opinion instability are both on the outside and in the inside 
of individual’s mind, for the extent of opinion instability depends on the amount of conflicting 
considerations existing in the environment and the ability to filter through them. Lastly, the 
BW model assumes that in the theoretical natural state, individuals choose their opinions 
essentially at random. In practice however, there are constraints, which limit the range of 
opinions an individual can assume. The strength of these constraints then determines the 
extent of opinion instability, with stronger constraints leading to less opinion instability. The 
strength of the constraints also varies across population, as not everyone is able to utilize the 
sources of constraints to the same extent. For example, one of the best sources of constraints, 
political ideologies, are so abstract they may be inaccessible for the majority of the population. 
As we can see, the BW model also assumes that opinion instability originates inside one’s 
mind, as a result of insufficient constraints one possesses. 
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As we can see, there is little consensus about the nature of opinion instability. This is 
unsurprising, as none of the presented models was developed with the goal of the explanation 
of opinion instability in mind. In fact, the nature of opinion instability remains an 
underdeveloped topic. However, while the presented models do not attempt to explain the 
nature of opinion instability, they do contribute to the understanding of factor influencing its 
prevalence.  This is where we will see their shared similarities. 
Generally, we can identify two groups of factors influencing the extent of opinion instability: 
internal and external ones. We will start with the internal factors. 
The first of the internal factors is the affective attachment to the topic in question. This factor 
appears in some form in all three models. In the BW model, the level of constraints is partially 
based on the centrality of the topic. Remember that centrality refers to the relative 
importance of topic in relation to the rest. The more central a topic is, the more affect it will 
be by the constraints. Similarly, the ELM argues that interest raises the stability of opinions, 
since the individuals will be more likely to engage in deeper deliberation. Lastly, the RAS model 
also associates interest with higher stability of opinions. However, in this case, the effect is 
indirect, as interest in the topic does not have any effect by itself but tends to lead to the raise 
of topic knowledge, which in turn lowers the prevalence of opinion instability. The interest in 
topic should therefore have negative effect on the level of opinion instability. However, the 
affective attachment may include other factors aside from interest. As noted by the ELM 
model, responsibility is another factor negatively influencing opinion instability. In the future, 
it may be fruitful to see if there are other affective factors, such as the sense of duty or the 
fear of social sanctions. 
Second of the internal factors is what we can call topic proficiency. By topic proficiency, we 
may understand the sum of knowledge on a specific topic an individual possesses and the skills 
necessary to utilize it. While both the BW model and the RAS model reject the role of general 
knowledge, all three models incorporate the role of domain/topic knowledge and skills. The 
BW model argues that the knowledge of political ideologies, or even just the superficial 
knowledge of relations between topics, can provide constraints necessary for stable opinions. 
However, to utilize them, the individual must not only know of a relevant political ideology to 
the topic at hand but must also possess enough skill to connect the ideology with the topic to 
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use it as a guide. The RAS model instead presents topic knowledge as a factor helping to keep 
one’s mind clear of conflicting considerations. Remember that according to the RAS model, 
people tend to reject considerations incongruent with their political predispositions. To do so, 
they must however first recognize these considerations as incongruent. Implicitly, they must 
also possess and recognize their political predispositions. Again, we see that higher knowledge 
of the topic should be related to lower rate of opinion instability. Lastly, we look into the ELM 
model. In this model, the topic knowledge is accounted in two ways. Firstly, the higher amount 
of knowledge allows the individual to form arguments in favour of the held opinions, which 
can be used to counter future persuasion attempts. Topic knowledge therefore improves the 
ability to hold specific opinions during a longer period of time. Secondly, topic knowledge may 
be necessary to understand and evaluate arguments proposed for certain topics. The 
understanding and evaluation of the arguments are necessary to form an elaborate opinion. 
In turn, a failure to achieve them lead to the reliance on contextual clues, as explained above. 
From the description above, we can see that the topic proficiency can be divided in two parts, 
knowledge held on the topic and cognitive skills to utilize said knowledge. In the future, it may 
be of best interest to look into the relationship between the two parts. For example, is it 
possible for someone to possess a high level of topic knowledge but lack the skills to use it, 
i.e. have encyclopaedic knowledge but lack critical thinking? If yes, does it influence the 
prevalence of opinion instability in any way? 
Now, let’s turn our attention to the external factors, first of which is the consistency of frames. 
Both studies related to the RAS model and the ELM model show that the frame of the topic 
can significantly alter opinions individuals hold. Some studies even note that these external 
factors may even overshadow the internal ones. The consistence of frames refers to the extent 
to which the frames are homogenous across sources. To put it differently, if some topic is 
consistently presented in the same way, we expect the opinion considering this topic to be 
more stable. This conclusion fits the RAS model especially well, since the more homogenous 
is the presentation of the topic, the more homogenous are the considerations related to it. 
Furthermore, as noted by the ELM model, homogenous presentation means that in practice, 
there is only one presented solution to the topic in question. This in turn means that no 
counter-persuasion attempts are made and no opinion instability can be expressed. On the 
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other hand, once several frames emerge, individuals have to deal with competing solutions 
and the potential for the opinion instability raises. 
Second of the external factors is the topic prevalence. Various topics differ by how much 
attention is given to them, both by the public and by the media. Topics, which enjoy more 
attention can be considered more prevalent. As with the consistency of frames, it can be 
argued that the prevalence of a topic has a negative effect on the prevalence of opinion 
instability. The more opportunities to encounter the topic the individuals have, the more likely 
it is they will understand the message and the argument related to it. Under the ELM model, 
this provides them with better opportunity to form an elaborated and more stable opinion. 
Furthermore, the individuals will have more opportunities to recognize, whether the 
consideration included in the messages are congruent with their political predispositions, as 
is described by the RAS model. We may also argue, in accordance with the agenda setting 
theory (McCombs, 2014), that high topic prevalence leads directly to high interest in the topic, 
as the public agenda tends to reflect the agenda of the media. Lastly, the ELM model provides 
interesting questions about the effect of topic prevalence. As mentioned before, the 
prevalence may not only have positive effect on the elaboration of opinions. If the topic is 
presented for too long, the public may get bored and employ various heuristic strategies to 
avoid spending too much energy on the topic. These elaborated strategies, relying on 
contextual clues, in turn lead to less stable opinions. In future it may be beneficial to further 
divide topic prevalence into topic intensity, i.e. how often is the topic referenced, and topic 
longevity, i.e. for how long has the topic been referenced. It may very well be possible that 
the topic intensity will be negatively associated with opinion instability, while the association 
between topic longevity and opinion instability will be positive. 
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Graph 4 – Synthesized model of opinion instability 
 
Lastly, I would like to mention one similarity shared by the presented models and that is the 
complete lack of social factors. As we have seen, the models paid great attention to the 
attributes possessed by individual, such as interest or knowledge. They also paid attention to 
the attributes of the topics in question. Neither of the models however paid attention to the 
social environment of the individual. This is disappointing, since there are several possibilities 
how social environment may play a role. We already discussed how opinion homogeneity of 
the close social environment may influence opinion instability. The more homogenous the 
social environment is, the less unstable the opinions of individuals inside may be. This may be 
because there are less attempts at persuasion or because the set of present considerations 
are more homogenous. While the cause is debatable, it may be fruitful to examine the effect 
of social environment in more detail. Another possibility may be looking into the opinion 
competitiveness of the environment. Some environments are naturally more competitive 
than others, i.e. people are expected to argue and defend their opinion on certain topics more 
often. A possible example would be the political scene, where one not only repeatedly 
presents their opinions, but also defends them against the opinions of others. We may 
hypothesise that people in such an environment may be more stable in regard to their 
opinions than people, whose opinions do not face routine opposition. This may be because 
these people will have a better prepared set of arguments defending them against persuasion 
attempts or because such environments require to hold  a cohesive world view, especially in 
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the field of politics, or because they express their opinion so often they may not have a 
possibility to forget and reiterate it. Whether the case, it may be interesting to see if groups 
of people more used to arguing their opinion also suffer less from opinion instability. Lastly, 
the social environment may be a source of spurious opinion instability. Here we can refer to 
the Spiral of silence theory (Noelle-Neumann, 1993), whose central claim in short is that, when 
people feel their opinion is in minority, they may cease to voice it or even start voicing what 
they feel is the opinion supported by the majority. It is easy to see how this can lead to a 
pattern easily prescribed to opinion instability. If a group of people for example prefers one 
outcome, but notices that they are a minority, its members may start to voice more 
ambivalent opinions in fear of social repercussion. Then, when their perception of what the 
majority favours changes, they will go back to their original opinions. In data, this would look 
like the popularity of the group’s preferred outcome started relatively high, then lowers and 
then raises back to the original value. This may be interpreted as opinion instability, even 
though this conclusion is disputable, as the true opinions of the group remained the same. In 
conclusion, measuring opinion instability in situations, where one outcome is clearly in 
majority may be difficult, due to social factors. Of course, all social factors presented above 
are merely suggestions and there is no proof of their effect. On the other hand, there is also 
no proof of their unimportance, as the social aspect has been for a large part ignored by the 
previous research on opinion instability. The few exceptions include works of Crespi (1997) 
and Hoffman, Glynn, Huge, Sietman, & Thomson (2007), who focused on social environment 
as the means of transmitting information. In the future, a more thorough look only on the 




The goal of this thesis was to provide some insight into the topic of opinion instability. 
Specifically, we had three questions: Does opinion instability exists? If yes, how prevalent is 
it? And what are its causes? As we have seen in chapter 2, the idea that opinion instability 
may be unstable had to face severe methodological critique, as some dismissed it as a mere 
measurement error. Despite this, there are several arguments that it may indeed be a real 
phenomenon, namely the fact that even after applying measurement corrections, some 
amount of instability remained. Furthermore, the assumption that opinions are safely stored 
inside one’s mind and most changes are due to the insufficient response scales is problematic 
by itself. While there is no definitive proof that the methodological critique is entirely wrong, 
the evidence suggests that opinion instability exists at least to some extent. The question then 
becomes, to what extent? As discussed in chapter 3, the prevalence of opinion instability 
varies wildly across studies, which are themselves few in numbers. This difference to some 
extent stems from the difference between the topics of studies in question, as well as from 
the difference of time gap between measurements. We could however conclude that time 
seems to play a role in the prevalence of opinion instability. More specifically, the wider the 
time gap between measurements, the higher the prevalence of opinion instability. However, 
the biggest factor determining the extent of opinion instability, overshadowing any other 
contributors, is the operationalization of the term opinion instability itself. As chapter 3 shows 
in greater detail, the proportion of individuals with unstable opinion in single dataset may 
range from 10 to 60 percent, depending on which route of operationalizing logic we follow. 
We discussed advantages and disadvantages of different operationalization schemes and 
concluded that the best way to estimate opinion instability is to use the corrected proportion 
of change or the difference between measurements. Above all, the main conclusion of the 
third chapter is that research of opinion instability would greatly benefit from more unified 
framework defining opinion instability. Lastly, we examined potential causes of opinion 
instability, through existing theories. Sadly, there are no developed models dedicated to the 
explanation of opinion instability, so we had to make do with models of opinion formation. 
We examined three models, the Black-and-White model, the Receive-Accept-Sample model 
and the Elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. Despite the fact that all of the models 
understood the nature of opinions and their potential instability in different ways, we found 
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great share of similarities between them. On the internal level, the factors contributing to the 
existence of opinion instability are affective attachment and topic proficiency. On the external 
level, the consistency of frames and the topic prevalence are the two factors referenced across 
several of the examined models. We also noted the lack of focus on social factors in all three 
models. 
Lastly, I have to mention several limitations of this thesis. First of all, the reader may notice a 
suspicious lack of focus on genuine opinion change, i.e. a situation, where an individual makes 
a deliberate one-time change of opinion. The lack of focus on genuine opinion change is 
symptomatic for most studies of opinion instability. Some models, such as the ELM model, 
refers to a theoretical distinction between different types of opinion changes, however their 
focus seems to be lacking. Generally, studies tend to assume that an opinion should be highly 
stable and when this is not the case, it is either because of opinion instability or measurement 
error. There is a small number of studies, which try to differentiate between genuine and 
random changes, usually through a higher number of measurements. However, most studies 
are based on panel data with only two measurements or on aggregated cross sectional 
surveys, which severely limits the options to take genuine opinion change into account. 
Whether this is because of financial or other reasons, I cannot say. However, in future, 
focusing more on differentiation between genuine and random changes of opinions would 
definitely be an improvement. 
Second limitation is in the theoretical scope of the thesis. While there are relatively little 
studies done on opinion instability, there is a comparatively enormous focus on opinion 
formation and these studies are spread across several fields. This thesis is built mainly on 
works of sociology and social psychology, as we have only brushed against the works of 
psychology and completely ignored fields such as neurology. This obviously limits the insight 
in the topic, however incorporating all relevant fields would be well beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Not only because their sheer number, but also because studies from other fields carry 
their own methodological pitfalls, which would demand our attention. For example, 
experimental studies are praised for their ability to examine causal relationships. On the other 
hand, experimental environment is heavily artificial and unlike anything that can be found 
outside of the laboratory walls. This can make any results gained from experimental studies 
ecologically invalid, i.e. just because an effect has been observed in a laboratory, it will not 
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necessarily be ever observed in everyday life. Such lack of ecological validity has been noted 
in connection with opinion instability by previous studies (J. Druckman & Leeper, 2012), which 
suggested that experimental studies may overestimate prevalence of opinion instability 
because of their artificial setting. For this and other reasons, I decide to limit my thesis to more 
familiar waters. 
Lastly, there is a problem of empirical foundation of presented information. It was my goal to 
empirically test or illustrate as many information presented in my thesis as possible. However, 
because the research of opinion instability by its very nature demands repeated measurement 
and panel data, my options were limited. I also strived to use as much data from the Czech 
Republic as possible. This is mainly because I believe there are often forgotten sociocultural 
differences between countries, which threaten the ecological validity of presented findings. 
The prevalence of opinion instability may for example differ between countries, due to the 
complexity of political landscape or differences in the historical importance of topics. It is 
therefore best not to assume direct transferability of findings across more remote 
sociocultural groups. This of course led to some difficulties. Panel studies in the Czech Republic 
are rare, especially those, which would measure opinions on specific topics rather than 
general beliefs or behaviours. It was for this, why for example the Czech household panel was 
not used. Secondly, it is surprisingly hard to find a study, which would measure an opinion on 
a wider range of more specific topics. Again, it is much more common to measure general 
beliefs. This forced me to work with several unrelated datasets and make other allowance. 
For example, you may notice that in chapter 2, the cohesion of opinions across topics and the 
stability of opinions over time is illustrated on two different data sets. The situation is 
especially dismal in chapter 4, concerned with the causes of opinion instability. Because all of 
the presented models refer to rather specific factors, their testing would require specific data. 
Such data was not available and the chapter is therefore purely theoretical. In future, it would 
be undoubtedly beneficial to test the information presented here on data specifically gathered 




Despite the limitation presented above, I believe my thesis can still provide insight into a less 
developed topic of opinion instability. It sums up the current knowledge of the topic and 
answers basic questions such as how is the opinion instability defined, how prevalent it is and 
what may be its causes. In this way, it answers some of the popular questions about the 
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